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INTRODUCTION

As we head into the twenty-first century, there are few industries
more crucial to our lives than telecommunications. It has become part of
the basic fabric of society, an irreducible element in our economy, our
culture, and our daily activity. An even more basic element of Western society is the concept of property and the rights and obligations which flow
therefrom. Given the central role of telecommunications, it is somewhat
surprising that the fundamental notions of property and property rights in
the context of telecommunications have not been more extensively considered by commentators.' This Article seeks to remedy that deficiency, at
least in part, by focusing on rights, including justifiable reliance interests,
which arise directly from federal regulation of interstate communications,
as it has been practiced for the last sixty-odd years. After surveying the
principal elements of such property rights in licenses as the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC or Commission) regulatees may enjoy,
the Article addresses the extent to which the courts consider reliance interests, particularly in instances of retroactive rule making.2
It may be useful to state at the outset what is meant by the generic
term "property rights." Broadly speaking, the term implies the ability to
buy; hold; use; sell; dispose of, in whole or in part; or otherwise determine
the status of an identifiable, separable, and discrete object, right, or privilege. There is, of course, no definition that is at once all-encompassing and
meaningful in every context. Ultimately, a property right defines the relationship of an individual not to a thing, but to other individuals or owners
in relationship to a thing. Among these other entities, of course, the gov-

1. Happily, as a consequence of the recent adoption of auctions as an alternative allocational method for certain portions of the spectrum, legal and economic commentators
have begun to focus attention on the property aspects of FCC licenses. See, e.g., Gregory L.
Rosston & Jeffrey S. Steinberg, Using Market-Based Spectrum Policy to Promote the Public Interest, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 87 (1997); Howard Shelanski & Peter Huber, The Attributes and Administrative Creation of Property Rights in Spectrum (Sept. 1996) (unpublished
paper, on file with author) (asserting that essential rights that constitute property have
evolved administratively for spectrum licensees); see also Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The
TelecommunicationsAct of 1996, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 39 (1996) ("Because we have no
markets in spectrum use, we have had to invent a method to create property rights in the
spectrum.").
2. State jurisdiction over telecommunications, of course, is an important and indeed
essential compliment to federal law and practice; but, the diversity of state law is too vast to
permit its inclusion here. For similar reasons, intellectual property, trade secrets, privacy,
and other related topics, although of increasing importance in a service economy, are not
addressed.
3. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CoRNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927)
(observing that property rights are relationships among an owner and other individuals in
relationship to things).
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ernment looms overwhelmingly by limiting the ability of an individual to
control the ownership incidents of many, indeed of most, forms of private
property. Many such limitations arise out of the undoubted police power to
adopt and enforce, for example, environmental regulations or handgun
controls. Even the FCC exercises such police power, as in the preemption
of local regulations limiting the placement of radio reception apparatus.4
But the Commission's exercise of its police power and the "taking" or
"due process" issues under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution do not
require extended analysis with respect to the scope of the regulatees' property rights based on physical goods such as utility poles5 or telephone
plants.6 These cases are in principle no different from other claimed
"takings." As a general rule, government has the right to take private property provided there is a legitimate public purpose and the compensation is
fair.
Rather, the principal concern here is with property which is not a
physical object or a contractual right, but a license. However thin or narrowly circumscribed their property rights as licensees may be, it is indisputable that those holding (or seeking) FCC authorizations are entitled to
the protection of the Constitution. They are therefore entitled to claim due
process, or equal protection rights, as against the Commission. But these
protections arise only if there is an interest or a property right to be protected, and the latter is the question that must be resolved first. Certainly
the overwhelming body of precedence is that FCC licensees do not have
the sort of property right that is protected from an unconstitutional taking,
in contrast to property rights in equipment, which are fully protected. But
4. See, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 207, 110
Stat. 56, 114 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1997)); Preemption
of Local Zoning Regulation of Satellite Earth Stations, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd.
5809, 2 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 723 (1996).
5. See, e.g., FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987) (holding that FCC's
limit on pole attachment fees is not an unconstitutional taking of property because the property owner may withdraw permission for the use of its poles and the rate mandated by the
FCC is not confiscatory).
6. Federal Power Comm'n. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944); Bell
Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 79 F.3d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Implementation of the Local
Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order,
11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1, Order on Reconsideration, 11 FCC Rcd.
13,042, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1057, Second Order on Reconsideration, 11 FCC Rcd.
19,738 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 420, aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. CompTel v.
FCC, 117 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir.), aff'd in partand vacated in part sub nom. Iowa Utils. Bd. v.
FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir.), clarified by Third Order on Reconsideration and Further
Notice of ProposedRulemaking, CC Docket No. 96-98, 1997 WL 469457 (Aug. 18, 1997).
A recent instance of the Commission's exercise of its nonlicensing police power is discussed in Cox Cable Communications, Inc. v. U.S., 866 F. Supp. 553 (M.D. Ga. 1994)
(considering and rejecting constitutional challenges to 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)).
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closer inspection suggests important protections do exist. I therefore first
address the FCC's pervasive licensing of private sector use of designated
portions of the electromagnetic spectrum, specifically the extent to which
such licensure has been deemed by the Commission and the courts to create protected property rights. Next I analyze the concept of reliance interests encompassing the enforceable legal or equitable right, whether created
by statutory, regulatory, or judicial action, to rely upon FCC action or inaction. Finally, I analyze the licensee's right to assert such interests against
the government.
Congress first enacted comprehensive regulation of the telecommunications industry in 1927, creating the Federal Radio Commission within
the Department of Commerce. Thereafter, in 1934 the law was extensively
expanded: the Communications Act (1934 Act) was passed, and the FCC
was brought into existence as an independent agency.8 The 1934 Act has
been amended from time to time, most recently and dramatically in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.9 This analysis will not focus on the
various changes in the Communications Act since 1934 but instead will
highlight the ways in which the fundamental notion of property, or property rights, has been treated both in the Communications Act, as amended
from time to time, and by the FCC and the courts in their decisions implementing the law.
Exercising its sovereign rights, Congress assumed in writing the 1934
Act, that the radio frequency spectrum belonged to the federal government.
As early as 1922, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover expressed the
view that the "ether" was a public possession. '° Whether the assumption
was that the government owned the spectrum or simply had the obligation
to police an otherwise inchoate opportunity is quite irrelevant to all that
followed. A 1969 article claimed that the government's appropriation of
the spectrum resource was grounded in the need to police spectrum in order to give it any value, and not in the government's assertion of a right to
the wealth created by spectrum use. In any case, "[n]o doubt official opinion now regards the spectrum as government property, but the justification
for this opinion is not self-evident.""
7. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1102 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 602(a)
(1994)). The first legislation affecting radio emissions was the Radio Act of 1912.
8. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1997).
9. See Telecommunications Act.
10. See A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934 64 (Max D.
Paglin ed., 1989).
11. Arthur S. De Vany et al., A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electro-
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In recent testimony before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection, FCC Chairman Reed Hundt alluded to Hoover's assertion of ownership and observed that the question
whether spectrum is public or private property is not easily resolved.' 2 He
indicated that treating spectrum as public property assures that access is
fairly distributed and that public benefits can be guaranteed, while treating
spectrum as private property maximizes economic benefits. Faced with
this dichotomy, Chairman Hundt suggested that the Commission has chosen a "third way" by amalgamating both approaches.' 3 Nevertheless, the
Chairman clearly believes the spectrum belongs to the people: "Those who
characterize public-interest obligations as encroachments on licensees'
rights ignore the fact that licensees use precious public property for their
own private gain."' 4 At least five members of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit are skeptical of the government's property interest in
spectrum: "[U]nallocated spectrum is government property only in the
special sense that it simply has not been allocated to any real 'owner' in
any way."' 5 Debate about the origin and extent of government property
rights in spectrum thus continues to the present. What is indisputable is
that in allowing members of the public to use any particular portion of the
spectrum, Congress was careful to specify that such authorization was
temporary, limited, and subject to withdrawal in a wide variety of circumstances.
These doctrines have been critical to administration of the Communications Act and are little changed from 1934. They have given rise to a
wide variety of problems for Commission licensees and may be expected
to continue to do so. It is an interesting threshold question: What is meant
when we say the government by law preserves its (assumed) right to regulate spectrum? Unlike land or water rights, offshore oil fields, or even air
rights owned by the government, spectrum is not tangible. It is, at least to a
physicist, a property (in its scientific sense) of nature; it has no tangible
magnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-EngineeringStudy, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1499, 1531
(1969).
12. Spectrum ManagementPolicy: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade
and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 39 (1997)
(statement of Reed E. Hundt, Chairman, FCC).
13. Id. at 2.
14. Id. at 21.
15. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(Williams, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc, with concurrence of Edwards,
Silberman, Ginsburg, and Sentelle, JJ.). The dissenting opinion analogized unallocated
spectrum to unappropriated water. The dissenters observed also that the government asserted its monopoly power over spectrum at a time when the relative unimportance of such
resources made the assertion of power modest. Id.
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being.' 6 It would probably be better, therefore, to say that the government
regulates electromagnetic radiation in certain defined frequencies, rather
than to say it regulates spectrum. Nevertheless, usage, by now hoary, is to
the contrary, and that convention is adopted here.
There are three basic property concepts which are important to the
administration of the Communications Act: (1) property rights in FCC licenses, such as the right to buy and sell or otherwise control licenses, (2)
reliance interests of licensees and others, and (3) property rights which
arise outside the Act but which are subject to the Act, such as ownership of
assets used for the provision of authorized, but nonspectrum-based services.' 7 There is a good deal of overlap among these and in many instances
the rights described in this Article may be implicated in all three. Only the
first two are considered here.
II. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FCC LICENSES
In a literal sense, no one owns an FCC license: not the licensee, nor
any other private party, and not even the public. 8 Although through the
years there have been many careless declarations to the contrary, both the
Commission and the courts have affirmed that licensees do have certain
property rights in their licenses. Apart from the broad statutory provisions
which limit such rights, virtually each of the FCC's regulations, by limiting a licensee's freedom of action in one way or another, may be considered a limitation of property rights. This Article does not cut such a wide
swath-both because such a broad proposition is self-evident, but also because it does not appear particularly useful.' 9 The basic statutory provisions addressing licensees' rights are in Title Ill of the Communications
Act. Section 301 of the Communications Act specifies, in part, that its purpose, among other things, is:
to maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels, but not
the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of time, under 1i-

16. When propagation of radio frequency (RF) energy through space was first discovered, it was thought that something called "ether" was the transport medium. As a result of
the Michelson-Morley experiments, we are now wiser, although the precise physical phenomena involved in RF propagation are still in dispute.
17. Physical assets used in licensed, spectrum-based activities, such as a radio transmitter, would also fall in the third category, but are not the focus of this Article.
18. But see Crowder v. FCC, 399 F.2d 569, 571 (D.C. Cir.) ("[broadcast frequency] belongs to the public, who through the Commission, award its use to a licensee to
operate consistent with the public interest."), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968).
19. See Shelanski & Huber, supra note 1, for an analysis of property rights of broadcast spectrum licensees based on the scope of their ability to use, alienate, subdivide, or
transfer their spectrum authorizations.
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censes granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of
the license.20

If this were not clear enough, section 304 goes further by demanding that
each prospective licensee relinquish any claims it may have to the frequency in question:
No station license shall be granted by the Commission until the applicant therefore shall have waived any claim to the use of any particular
frequency or of the electromagnetic spectrum as against the regulatory
power of the United States because of the previous use of the same,
21
whether by license or otherwise.

Section 316 of the Communications Act gives the FCC authority to modify
any license if, in its judgment, such modification is required by the public
interest, convenience, or necessity.2 Section 309(h)(1) provides that a
"station license shall not vest in the licensee any right to operate the station
nor any right in the use of the frequencies designated in the license beyond
the term thereof .... '" Section 310(d) specifies that no license, or any
rights thereunder "shall be transferred, assigned or disposed of' except
upon Commission approval.24
In FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station,2 the Court confirmed that
FCC licenses are subject to suspension, modification, or revocation in the
public interest and that licenses carry no vested property rights sufficient
to protect the licensee against competition. "The policy of the Act is clear
that no person is to have anything in the nature of a property right as a result of the granting of a license." 26 On the other hand, in Yankee Network,
Inc. v. FCC, after acknowledging that the Communications Act specifically precludes application of the concept of common law rights to li20. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 301, 48 Stat. 1064, 1081 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 301 (1994)).
21. 47 U.S.C. § 304. This provision, first appearing in the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169,
44 Stat. 1162, was intended to address circumstances in which, prior to the adoption of any
government regulation, private parties had begun radio transmission. These parties might
have been expected to contend that by doing so some sort of equitable right in the nature of
an implied easement or adverse possession had been established. In this context the provision might have been narrowly read to mean that the waiver is confined to a claim based on
prior use; for example, use prior to the license grant for which the waiver is required. In
fact, the waiver language has been far more broadly interpreted. See, e.g., Revision of Rules
and Policies for the Direct Brdcst. Satellite Serv., Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 9712,
para. 139, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 928 (1995), [hereinafter DBS Report and Order], aff'd
sub nom. DirecTV, Inc. v. FCC, 110 F.3d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
22. 47 U.S.C. § 316.

23. Id. § 309(h)(1).
24. Id. § 310(d).
25. SandersBros., 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
26. Id. at 475.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

censes, the court observed that "the Act does definitely recognize the
rights of license holders in express terms no less than seven times." 27 The
court added: "It is equally apparent that the granting of a license by the
Commission creates a highly valuable property right, which, while limited
in character, nevertheless provides the basis upon which large investments
''
of capital are made and large commercial enterprises are conducted."
This theme was repeated in L.B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, in which the
court noted that licensees do have certain rights:
That private as well as public interests are recognized by the Act is not
to be doubted. While a station license does not under the Act confer an
unlimited or indefeasible property right--the right is limited in time
and quality by the terms of the license and is subject to suspension,
modification or revocation in the public interest-nevertheless the
right under a license for a definite term to conduct a broadcasting
business requiring---as it does--substantial investment is more than a
mere privilege or gratuity. A broadcasting license is a thing of value to
the person to whom it is issued ....[P]rovisions of the Communications Act itself.., recognize that a broadcasting 21icense confers a private right, although a limited and defeasible one.
The L.B. Wilson language has been widely cited subsequently but it is
clear that the courts (principally the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit) have wrestled somewhat unsatisfactorily with defining the scope
of a licensee's property rights. The much quoted GreaterBoston Television Corp. v. FCC observes that the Act does not reflect the same degree
of concern for "security of certificate" as do other laws.Y In Reuters Ltd. v.
FCC,3' the court rejected an FCC decision rescinding a grant as improvidently made in order to consider a later-filed, mutually exclusive application. In doing so the court observed that a properly granted radio license is
a "vested interest. '32 And in Orange Park Florida T.V., Inc. v. FCC, the

27. Yankee Network, 107 F.2d 212, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
28. Id. at 217.
29. L.B. Wilson, 170 F.2d 793, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (citation omitted). A more overt
narrowing of Sanders Brothers appears in Atlantic Business and Community Development
Corp., 994 F.2d 1069, 1073-74 (3rd Cir. 1993) (citation omitted):
We do not think Sanders Brothers holds that an FCC license has none of the attributes of property. The Communications Act itself seems to imply the existence
of a limited property right in an FCC license once it is granted. Section 301 ...
implies the creation of rights akin to those created by a property interest limited
only by the "terms, conditions and periods of the license."
30. GreaterBoston TV Corp., 444 F.2d 841, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 923 (1971).
31. Reuters, 781 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
32. Id. at 950 n.5; cf Central Fla. Enter., Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 60 n.18 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (concluding that the 1934 Act disfavors vested license rights) (quoting Citizens
Comm. Ctr. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
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same court, after quoting Sanders Brothers for the proposition that a
broadcast license is not a full-fledged, indefeasible property interest since
it is limited in duration and may be held only so long as the licensee operates in the public interest, went on to say that "[n]either is it a nonprotected interest, defeasible at will. Indeed, to suggest as much would,
among other things, throw considerable doubt on the Commission's wellknown recognition of a renewal expectancy that leads applicants to vie for
licenses which, if awarded, will require a significant expenditure of resources."33 At the same time, broadcast licensees have commonly been referred to as public trustees or fiduciaries. 34
There has not been any definitive holding concerning the extent of
property rights in an FCC-granted license. Nevertheless from the foregoing
it would appear reasonable to conclude that the courts have recognized that
licenses do indeed have certain incidents of property, more clearly perhaps
vis- L-vis private parties but even as against the plenary power of the
Commission in certain circumstances. The discussion which follows will
help to illuminate the limits on a licensee's property rights and judicial efforts to weigh such rights in the public interest balance.

33. Orange Park Fla. T.V., 811 F.2d 664, 674 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1987). This "renewal
expectancy," as set forth in Cowles Broadcast, Inc., Decision ; 86 F.C.C.2d 993, para. 68,
49 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1138 (1981), aff'd. sub nom. CentralFlorida.Enterprises., Inc. v.
FCC,683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 (1983), may be conceptualized as a future interest, based on the presumption, albeit rebuttable, that adequate performance warrants renewal. The extent to which the renewal expectancy could be construed
as a legal right or equity, and the vicissitudes of the comparative renewal process, are summarized in Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1206-10 (D.C. Cir.
1971). The Commission has recognized that if a licensee is immune to challenges at renewal time it "would appear to create a property right in that frequency beyond the contemplation of both Congress and the courts ...." Carlisle Brdcst. Assocs., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 885, para. 12, 37 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 777 (1976)
(footnote omitted). One Commissioner in a dissenting statement to an earlier Cowles decision, Cowles FloridaBroadcast,Inc., Decision, 60 F.C.C.2d 372, 37 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1487 (1976), alluded to the all but automatic renewal of broadcast licenses and commented
that "[d]espite the legal theory of the Communications Act that a license is not a property
right, the practical reality has been quite different, as all the world knows." Id. at 435
(footnote omitted). Commissioner Robinson also suggested there should be legal recognition that a licensee has "a property right in its license which is defeasible only for serious
misbehavior." Id. at 442. Any other view "blink[s] reality." Id. at 446. Some 20 years later
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 enacted such a presumption into positive law. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 204(a), § 309, 47 U.S.C.A. § 309 (West Supp. 1997).
One commentator has characterized this law as creating "virtually perpetual licenses to all
radio and television stations." Krattenmaker, supra note 1, at 12.
34. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984); Office of
Comm. of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (stating that
broadcasters are fiduciaries of a public resource).
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Assignment and Transfer

Sections 301, 304, and 309 of the Communications Act are the principal pillars upon which the Commission has erected its corpusjurisdealing with assignment or transfer of Commission licenses.35 Simply put, if a
licensee entity wishes to assign or transfer its license to another party,
Commission approval is required 6 This constraint on one of the most
elementary aspects of property alone goes far to limit property rights. It
has generated an incalculable amount of work for the FCC, since each purchase, sale, assignment, or transfer of a licensed entity-or an entity controlling a licensed entity-has required Commission approval.37 The need
for prior approval is applicable even to pro forma,38 or other nonsubstantive changes in ownership or control; 39 as well as to instances where two
unrelated entities enter into an arm's length transaction, for example, the
sale of a corporate entity holding an FCC license.
Although it is commonly said that Commission approval is required
for the purchase or sale of an entity holding an FCC license, a more precise
formulation is that prior Commission approval is required for the transfer
of control of the licensee or assignment of the license. The 1934 Act proscriptively declares that no license shall be assigned or transferred in violation of the Act, and no entity may hold a license without an affirmative
Commission finding that the public interest would be served thereby.40 As
a practical matter, however, it is perfectly legal (if no other constraints exist) to sell an entity which holds an FCC license without prior Commission
approval; in such a case, however, the license is not transferred legally to

35. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, §§ 301, 304, 309, 48 Stat. 1064, 1081-85
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 301, 304, 309 (West Supp. 1997)). There are other
relevant provisions, however. Section 309(h), together with § 606, provide the President
with plenary power to control radio licenses during time of war or in other instances of national emergency. They have not been relied upon much in recent history.
36. An admirably comprehensive review of this subject may be found in Stephen F.
Sewell, Assignments and Transfers of Control of FCCAuthorizations under Section 310(d)
of the CommunicationsAct of 1934, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 277 (1991).
37. Sale of controlling stock in a licensed entity would involve the transfer of control
of the license to the new owner of the stock even if the licensee entity remains the same;
sale of the licensee's assets, including the license, requires an assignment of the license to a
new entity. Contel Cellular, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 5309, 75
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1342 (1994). There are, of course, a plethora of reasons involving tax
and other non-FCC issues for choosing to make an acquisition either by purchase of stock
or purchase of assets.
38. 47 U.S.C.A. § 309(c)(2)(B). See TeleCourier Comm. Corp., Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 10,014 (1995).
39. Hinton Tel. Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 6643, 71 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 974 (1992).
40. 47 U.S.C.A. § 309(a).
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the new owner who has neither the license nor any of the rights pertaining
thereto. Proceeding in this fashion is unusual, indeed rare, because the
FCC license is frequently the most valuable asset on the target entity's balance sheet and, in such circumstances, the license must be understood to
be abandoned and forfeited.4' The need for Commission approval to assign
or transfer an FCC license has sometimes inclined the parties to a transaction to structure it as a stock transaction rather than as an asset sale, since
the notion of "selling" the assets, including the FCC license, may be
thought to breach the 1934 Act's injunction against the possession of property rights in a license.

B.

Sale of a "Bare" License

The assignment and transfer rules outlined above apply to instances
in which a licensee is operating a facility pursuant to authority granted by
the Commission. Frequently, however, the holder of a license (or construction permit) who has not yet constructed and operated the authorized
facility wishes to divest itself of the license or the entity holding the license. In such instances, FCC parlance describes the purchase or sale of a
"bare" license, and for many years the Commission has maintained a policy against the for-profit sale of unbuilt radio or television broadcast stations on the theory that to allow such sales would be to acknowledge that
the license itself was an asset which could be bought and sold like any
other.42 The policy, which applies across the board to all broadcast serv-

41. Perfection Music, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 30 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
12 (1974). This doctrine of automatic forfeiture where a licensee assigns or transfers a license without Commission approval may be considered salutary by the transferee or assignee since in such cases §§ 501, 502, and 503 provide for forfeitures, fines, and in cases
of knowing and willful violations of the 1934 Act, prison terms. Where such unauthorized
transfers or assignments are made under circumstances which do not call into question the
licensee's basic qualifications, the Commission generally has adopted a forgiving attitude,
occasionally imposing modest forfeitures. See, e.g., FM Brdcst. of Douglas County, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 10,429, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 772 (1995).
42. Amendment of Section 73.3597 of the Comm'n's Rules, Report and Order, 52
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1081 (1982) [hereinafter Amendment of Section 73.3597 Report and
Order], reconsideredby 99 F.C.C.2d 971, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1149 (1985); Revision
and Update of Part 22 of the Pub. Mobile Radio Servs. Rules, Report and Order, 95
F.C.C.2d 769, 54 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1661 (1983), reconsidered by Order on Reconsideration, 101 F.C.C.2d 799, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1051 (1985),further reconsideredby
Order on FurtherReconsideration, 2 FCC Rcd. 1798, 62 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 861 (1987).
The FCC has suggested the existence of other reasons to bar the sale of bare licenses, including: (1) preservation of the integrity of the Commission's application processes and the
promotion of new services, Assignment and Transfer of Construction Permits for new
Brdcst. Stations, Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.2d 789, 15 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1568
(1969); (2) the desire to discourage "speculative" applications seeking not the opportunity
to build and operate a licensed facility, but merely the grant of a valuable license for resale,
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ices, has been explained as follows:
Sections 301 and 304 provide, inter alia, that licenses issued by the
Commission convey no property interest. To allow a permit to be
transferred in a situation in which the station seller obtains a profit,
prior to the time that programs tests have commenced, would appear to
violate this prohibition. The permittee would appear to have nothing to
convey for profit other than the 43mere expectation of future profits,
which appends to the permit itself.
Unbuilt broadcast stations can, however, be sold for an amount equal to
the documented legitimate and prudent expenses incurred in applying for
the facility and attempting to put it in operation.'
While the Commission in general has looked askance at the sale of
unbuilt facilities, in recent years it has relaxed the broad prohibition in
certain instances. In Bill Welch, 5 a much-cited case, the Commission reconsidered its policy in this respect and approved the for-profit sale of a
cellular telephone authorization. The Commission reviewed its prior policy
and the legislative history of sections 301 and 304 of the 1934 Act. It concluded that the purpose of those provisions was to preserve the government's rights vis-a-vis those of a licensee: "[T]he language of these sections... seems to address congressional concerns that the Federal
Government retain ultimate control over radio frequencies, as against any
rights, especially property rights, that might be asserted by licensees who
are permitted to use the frequencies. 4 6 Similarly, the Commission found
no language in section 310(d) of the 1934 Act which suggests any Congressional intent to limit the ability of a permittee or licensee to receive a
profit for its authorization upon an assignment or transfer approved by the
Commission.47
see infra Part I.C.; and (3) cases in which a licensee with liabilities but no assets of any
value other than its license seeks Commission approval for assignment or transfer of the
license to a third party. See, e.g., Bonanza Brdcst. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order,
10 F.C.C.2d 906, 11 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1072 (1967).
43. Amendment of Section 73.3597 of the Comm'n's Rules, Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 47 Fed. Reg. 985, 987 (1982); see also Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of
the Communications Act, Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 7988, para. 393, 76 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 326 (1994); Amendment of Parts 2, 21, 74 and 94 of the Comm'n's Rules
and Regs., Report and Order, 94 F.C.C.2d 1203, paras. 143-44 (1983), reconsidered by
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 98 F.C.C.2d 1249, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 421 (1984).
44. Amendment of Section 73.3597 Report and Order, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1081,
para. 33.
45. Bill Welch, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Review, 3 FCC Rcd. 6502, 65
Rad. Reg. 2d 755 (1988).
46. Id. para. 11.
47. Id. para. 14. Indeed, as the Commission notes, there is strong evidence in the legislative history that no such limitation on profitable sale was intended. The elimination of a
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Although the Bill Welch case has been widely cited for the proposition that the Commission now has recognized broader property rights in its
licenses, the Commission limited its holding in two substantial ways. First,
it specified that the holding applied only to the specific context in which it
arose, for example, cellular telephone authorizations under part 22 of the
Commission's rules." Second, it specified that the holding did not, in any
way, affect continued enforcement of the Commission's policies reflected
in the cellular antitrafficking rule.49 In fact, the Commission has also been
less concerned about the sale of bare permits in the Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) service. Indeed, from its inception in 1982, that service has
never had an explicit rule or policy barring such sales. In DirectsatCorp.,
the Commission explained that the presence of due diligence obligations in
the DBS service provides sufficient assurance that speculation in unbuilt
facilities in general is not the goal of DBS permittees."
C.

Prohibitionson Speculation or Trafficking

Closely related to the prohibition on the sale of a bare license are
prohibitions on speculation or trafficking. Among the many ways in which
the Commission has interpreted the Communications Act to limit the property rights of licensees, none are more long-lived or curious than the
Commission's oft-cited prohibitions on speculating or trafficking in FCC
licenses." There are three principal elements in the offense of trafficking:
(1) the length of time the station was held; (2) whether it was to be sold for
a profit; and (3) whether there was speculative intent.5 As set forth in the

Senate bill provision that would have limited the level of profit available for the sale of radio licenses suggests the absence of congressional policy to limit profitable sales. Id. para.
15.
48. 47 C.F.R. §§ 22.1-22.383, 22.900-92.959 (1996). Therefore, rules adopted in other
services which bar for-profit sales of unbuilt licenses, for example, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3597,
were to remain in effect. However, the Commission has acknowledged that the Bill Welch
case may call into question the statutory basis for other property-limiting rules such as those
affecting reverter and security rights in the broadcast industry. Review of the Comm'n's
Regs. and Policies Affecting Investment in the Brdcst. Indus., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 7 FCC Rcd. 2654, para. 22 (1992).
49. See 47 C.F.R. § 22.139 (previously codified at 47 C.F.R. § 22.40(b)).
50. Directsat Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 88, para. 4 (1995).
51. Use of the word "trafficking" in this context is traceable to hearings on bills which
ultimately became the Radio Act of 1927. According to one early commentator it was intended to condemn those who had aggressively taken advantage of their rights under the
Radio Act of 1912. See Harry P. Warner, Transfer of BroadcastingLicenses Under the
CommunicationsAct of 1934, 21 B.U. L. REv. 585, 594-95 (1941).
52. Atlantic Coast Brdcst. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 Rad. Reg. (P &
F) 1045, para. 15 (1962); Zenith Radio Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60
F.C.C.2d 1012, para. 6, 38 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 585 (1976).
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typically stem terms which are used to describe the offense, Crowder v.
FCC,notes the following:
Trafficking is condemned because "a government license granted in
reliance on an applicant's stated intention to operate should not, instead, be bartered away for profit, i.e., that license should not be
granted to persons whose primary intent is to sell 53them at a profit
rather than to operate a station in the public interest.
The rationale appears to rest on the assumption that a radio license is a
privilege, granted for the opportunity to serve the public interest and that
to permit acquisition and sale of such licenses merely for the profit of doing so is incompatible with the trustee status of a broadcast licensee. A
common subtheme is that frequent changes in ownership do not serve the
public interest. As indicated in Guy S. Erway: "[t]he Commission wants to
minimize the public service disruption that accompanies frequent ownership changes. This means that.., a speculator... is not welcome in the
broadcast field."
If these are the rationales, there is much less reason to apply the policy to the common carrier or private radio side of the Commission's jurisdiction, where mobile, microwave, or business radio licenses are frequently granted merely as a tool to carry out a nonbroadcast business. Case
law, however, does not reflect any such distinction. The Commission acknowledged in Bill Welch,55 that there is nothing in the 1934 Act that explicitly bans trafficking. 6 Nevertheless, the antispeculation and antitraf53. Crowder, 399 F.2d 569, 571 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting WMIE-TV, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1091, para. 13 (1955)), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962
(1968).
54. Guy S. Erway, 90 F.C.C.2d 755, 774 (1980) (citing Edina Corp., 4 F.C.C.2d 36, 7
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 767 (1966), review denied by FCC 66-946 (1966), aff'd per curiam
sub nona. Norseman Brdcst. Corp. v. FCC, 12 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 2007 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
55. Bill Welch, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Review, 3 FCC Rcd. 6502, 65
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 755 (1988).
56. Section 3090) of the Act, enacted in 1993 to provide auction authority, directs the
Commission to adopt antitrafficking provisions for licenses won by auction. Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(a), 107 Stat. 387
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (1994)). The statutory language and the Commission's implementing regulations speak of the avoidance of unjust enrichment. See, e.g., Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bidding, Second Report
and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 2348, paras. 211-15, 258-65, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1 (1994)
[hereinafter Section 309(j) Second Report and Order]; Competitive Bidding (IVDS), Fourth
Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 2330, para. 30, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 188 (1994). Similarly, section 309(i)(4)(c) of the 1934 Act requires the Commission to adopt, inter alia, antitrafficking restrictions to prevent unjust enrichment of lottery winners. See 47 U.S.C. §
309(i)(4)(C); Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act-Competitive
Bidding, FirstReport and Order,9 FCC Rcd. 7373, 74 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 700 (1994).
The Commission has done so by adopting 15 separate provisions. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§
1.2111(b)-(d); 21.960(b)(5), (d)(1); 24.309(f); 24.712(b); 26.210(d); 90.810(b); and
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ficking policies endure. Today, the antitrafficking policy appears in the
broadcasting context (in a reduced form),57 the MMDS" and cellular59
services, fixed microwave6 and others. 6' However, the Commission has
adopted relaxed antitrafficking policies for cellular radio permits awarded
after a lottery.62 More generally, the Commission's bark in respect to traf95.816(e) (1996). In predominant part these rules address circumstances in which resale is
proposed by entities which won auctions as specially advantaged designated entities. See
Section 309() Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 2348, paras. 211-15, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1. An antitrafficking provision added by the Cable Act of 1992, previously codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 537, established a three-year holding requirement for cable systems. Implementing rules at 47 C.F.R. § 76.502 were adopted by the Commission. See Implementation
of Sections 11 and 13 of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 6828, para. 48, 6881 (Appendix D), 73 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 627 (1993), reconsidered by memorandum opinion and order, 10 FCC Rcd. 4654, 76
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1560 (1995). Section 301(i) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
eliminated these restrictions. See Implementation of Sections 202(f), 202(i) and 301(i) of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Order,2 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 293, 294 (1996).
57. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3597. In 1982, under pressure from the industry, the Commission
eliminated the antitrafficking rule in the broadcast context. Amendment of Section 73.3597
Report and Order, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1081 (1982); see also Memorandum Opinion
and Order,4 FCC Rcd. 1710, para. 12, 66 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 219 (1989), aff'd sub nom.
Office of Comm. of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 911 F.2d 813 (D.C. Cir. 1990), in
which the Commission concluded that acquiring a broadcast station for the purpose of enhancing its market value does not constitute a detriment to the public interest.
58. Amendment of Parts 1, 2 and 21 of the Comm'n's Rules, Report and Order,8 FCC
Rcd. 1444, para. 11, 71 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1356 (1993); 47 C.F.R. § 21.39; Amendment
of Parts 21 and 74 of the Comm'n's Rules, Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 9589, paras.
158-60, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 856 (1995); see also 47 C.F.R. § 21.934.
59. 47 C.F.R. §§ 22.137(d), 22.139, 22.943.
60. Id. § 101.55.
61. Id. § 100.19 (DBS); Amendment of Part 90 of the Comm'n's Rules, Memorandum
Opinion and Order,7 FCC Rcd. 4484, para. 7, 70 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1517 (1992) (220
MHz service); 47 C.F.R. §§ 90.153, 90.709 (private land mobile service); 47 C.F.R. §
25.143(g) (mobile satellite service). The Commission has opined that awarding licenses by
auction discourages insincere applicants and has in numerous contexts limited its antitrafficking regulations in specific services to the favorably treated "designated entities." See,
e.g., Amendment of Parts 2 and 90 of the Comm'n's Rules, Second Report and Order and
Second FurtherNotice of Proposed Rule Making, 10 FCC Rcd. 6884, paras. 141-43, 77
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 960 (1995).
62. Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules to Allow the Selection from Among Mutually
Exclusive Competing Cellular Applications Using Random Selection, Report and Order,98
F.C.C.2d 175, para. 77, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 8 (1984). Closely related to its antitrafficking policy is the Commission's policy against warehousing spectrum, that is,
"acquiring, or retaining... spectrum on the basis of speculative demand at the expense of
other potential users." GTE Corp. and Southern Pac. Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 94 F.C.C.2d 235, para. 67, 54 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 161 (1983); see also Amendment
of Parts 21 and 74 of the Comm'n's Rules with Regard to Filing Procedures in the Multipoint Distribution Serv., Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 9589, para. 160, 78 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 856 (1995); DBS Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 9712, para. 205, 1 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 928 (1995), aff'd sub nom. DirecTV, Inc. v. FCC, 110 F.3d 816 (D.C. Cir.
1997). 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(B) (mandating that the Commission impose performance re-
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ficking or speculation most often has proved much worse than its bite. In
most circumstances a permittee or licensee of an unbuilt facility need only
assure the Commission that its acquisition of the authorization was not for
speculative purposes in order to win approval. 63 In the Bill Welch case, for
example, the Commission, having concluded that for-profit sales of unbuilt
authorizations in the cellular service are lawful under the Communications
Act and "will serve the public interest," the Commission evaluated the
proposed sale under then-effective § 22.40 of the rules.6 ' To do so it reviewed the affidavit submitted by the transferor which indicated that "the
transferor acquired the construction authorization for the purpose of constructing and operating the system, and that its decision to sell was
prompted by changing business conditions and its determination that ' it
would not be economical to build the system on a stand-alone basis."
Based on this undisputed assurance, the Commission approved the proposed sale. In addition, there are exceptions to the prohibition against trafficking in instances of pro forna changes, involuntary transfers, or instances where a transfer is an incidental part of the bona fide sale of an
ongoing business. The Commission has not yet had an opportunity to apply
the antitrafficking and unjust enrichment provisions of section 309 of the
1934 Act in a specific case involving competitive bidding. Whether its enforcement of those provisions will be as loose as it has been in respect to
earlier instances remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it is clear the antitrafficking policy is not only an important part of the Commission's historical
regulation of the broadcast industry, but continues to be important in
evaluating the scope of licensees' protected interests.
D.

Security Interests

When telecommunications properties are bought, sold, or refinanced
the ability of a buyer or creditor to use telecom assets, especially the FCC

quirements inter alia to prevent spectrum warehousing).
63. The Guy S. Erway case candidly, if inelegantly, admits that proving guilty intent is
difficult: "It's hard to prove 'intent' because no applicant in his right mind is going to take
the stand and openly admit he acquired a station or stations for sale rather than service."
Guy S. Erway, 90 F.C.C.2d 755, para. 12 (1980). To cure this difficulty, the Commission
looks to all the relevant past and present facts and circumstances. See Romac Baton Rouge
Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order,7 F.C.C.2d 564, para. 8, 9 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1029 (1967); Prairieland Brdcst., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 49 F.C.C.2d 1377,
para. 9, 32 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 78 (1974).
64. 47 C.F.R. § 22.40(b) (1988) (in pertinent part contained the following: "Cellular
systems: The sale of a cellular construction permit will only be permitted after a showing
that the transferor is not speculating in cellular licenses.").
65. Bill Welch, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Review, 3 FCC Rcd. 6502, para.
23, 65 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 755 (1988).
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license, for securing debt is commonly a major issue. Lenders, of course,
want a first-perfected security interest in as many assets as possible. They
frequently seek a security interest in the FCC license of the entity to which
they are loaning funds, or of a parent or subsidiary, recognizing the pivotal
role of the authorization in establishing and maintaining the commercial
value of the borrower. By analogy to other forms of collateral, creditors
often ask for the right to foreclose on a license or otherwise to acquire it
following default in debt service or repayment of principal, applying the
proceeds of such foreclosure or acquisition to the discharge or reduction of
the borrower's obligation. 66 The borrower is also generally asked to provide representations and warranties that the security interests created by
the sale or loan agreement are enforceable and in accordance with law.
Frequently the borrower is asked to agree by contract to assist the lender in
securing assignment or transfer of the license to the lender in the event of
default or some other failure of the borrower to perform.
For many years the Commission routinely rejected third party assertions of interests in FCC licenses. In Radio KDAN, Inc., the Commission
declared a contractual provision purporting to mortgage a license void ab
initio and adding that it is untenable to consider a license to be a mortgageable chattel in the ordinary commercial sense. 67 The FCC stated in
Kirk Merkley that a "broadcast license, as distinguished from the station's
plant or physical assets, is not an owned asset or vested property interest so
as to be subject to a mortgage, lien, pledge, attachment, seizure, or similar
property right."' In Stephens Industries,Inc. v. McClung, the court, citing
Kirk Merkley, held that an FCC license could not be used as collateral for a

66. Under § 9-106 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a government license is a
"general intangible," defined as "any personal property (including things in action) other
than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, investment property, rights to
proceeds of written letters of credit, and money." U.C.C. § 9-106 (1995). It is worth noting,
however, that Article 9 states expressly that it does not apply "to a security interest subject
to any statute of the United States, to the extent such statute governs the rights of parties to
and third parties affected by transactions in particular types of property." Id. § 9-104(a).
67. Radio KDAN, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 F.C.C.2d 934 n.1, 12
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 584, reconsiderationdenied by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 100 (1968), affd sub nom. W. H. Hansen v. FCC, 413 F.2d 374 (D.C.
Cir. 1969). Radio KDANis widely cited for this proposition even though the text which addresses the extent to which a security interest is allowed in a license appears to be dictum.
The holding of the case is that the license had been forfeited by allowing the station to go
silent. Id. at 935.
68. Kirk Merkley, Memorandum Opinionand Order,94 F.C.C.2d 829, para. 3, 54 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 68 (1983), reconsiderationdenied by Memorandum Opinion and Order,56
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 413 (1984), aff'd mem. sub nom. Kirk Merkley v. FCC, 776 F.2d 365
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
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mortgage. 69 These cases rely principally on the notion that the hypothecation of licenses "'endangers the independence of the licensee who is and
who should be at all times accountable to the Commission in the exercise
of the broadcasting trust." 70
These restrictions, imposed by current Commission case law interpreting the 1934 Act, sharply limit the ability of a seller or borrower to
comply with requests for security even though such requests may be commercially reasonable and customary in other contexts. On the one hand, the
borrower cannot warrant or represent that the lender can foreclose on an
FCC permit, nor that the creation of such a right of foreclosure, or even a
secured interest in the license, is in accordance with law. On the other
hand, the borrower can agree to cooperate with a lender, subject to Commission approval, to seek the transfer or assignment of an FCC license to
the lender under certain circumstances. Nevertheless, if lenders could get
no comfort from the value of a spectrum license, the movement of capital
into licensees would be severely constrained. Moreover, the Commission
itself has an interest in assuring that the licensee community has access to
capital markets. Such access facilitates the movement of FCC licenses to
those entities best able to finance and operate licensed facilities. It also
provides a mechanism, consistent with the Communications Act, which
will facilitate the placement of debt for financing of sales, facility improvement, or the acquisition of additional licensed properties. In 1992,
prompted by petitions seeking revisions to its policy, the Commission
adopted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry71 seeking
public comment on proposals to allow creditors to acquire security interests and to permit reversionary interests in broadcast licenses. No action
has been taken yet on these proposals.
In the meantime, however, prompted by the needs of the marketplace,
the Commission has responded by developing the doctrine of "asset pro-

69. Stephens Indus., 789 F.2d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 1986).
70. In re Smith, 94 B.R. 220, 221 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1988) (quoting Kirk Merkley, 94
F.C.C.2d at 829).
71. Review of the Comm'n's Regs. and Policies Affecting Inv. in the Brdcst. Indus.,
Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Notice of Inquiry, 7 FCC Rcd. 2654, para. 18-23
(1992) [hereinafter Investment in the Brdcst. Indus. Notice of ProposedRule Making and
Notice of Inquiry].
72. In adopting rules and policies to implement its 1993 grant of authority to auction
licenses (47 U.S.C. § 309(j)), the Commission recognized the need to remove obstacles to
capital formation for auction winners and provided for installment payments by so-called
designated entities. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(A) (1994); Section 309(j) Second Report and
Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 2348, para. 231-40, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1,reconsidered in part
and denied in part by Fifth Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 5532, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d 859
(1994).
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ceeds." That is, while a creditor may not insist that the FCC honor the private contract between a defaulted borrower and the secured lender, to permit the lender to acquire the license, the creditor can ask for and receive an
enforceable right to the proceeds of the sale of the license. The asset proceeds doctrine coalesced as a result of In re Tak Communications,Inc.,7 in
which the court, construing the 1934 Act and FCC precedent, concluded
that the FCC would not allow any security interest in a broadcast license.
Prompted by a ruling which, while rationally based on prior Commission
precedent, posed the question in stark terms and appeared to deny creditors
any securable interests in FCC licenses, the Commission addressed itself
squarely to the issue and rejected the Tak ruling in Walter 0 Cheskey,74
holding that FCC policy is not violated by a security interest in the proceeds of sale of a license.7 The rationale supporting the assets proceeds
doctrine also accepts the notion that a contractual right to the proceeds of
the sale of a license is compatible with the licensee's obligations and with
the statutory requirement that no license can be transferred or assigned
without prior Commission approval. 76 With the Commission's position
thus clarified, the courts have also accepted this view. Allowing a creditor
to enforce a proprietary interest in the proceeds of a sale once the FCC has
approved that sale does not enable that creditor or any other party to assert
rights contrary to the FCC's regulatory powers and thus does not violate
FCC policy. 77 In re Beach Television Partnersindicates that "courts have
73. In re Tak Comm., Inc., 985 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1993). The liens at issue in Tak were
not asserted merely against the proceeds of the sale of the license, but gave the creditors the
right to take possession of the collateral. See In re Tak Comm., Inc., 138 B.R. 568, 570
(W.D. Wis. 1992).
74. Walter 0 Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. 986, para. 8, 74 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1031 (1994).
The Walter 0 Cheskey ruling appears to be the most widely cited of this line of cases. In
Walter 0 Cheskey the Chief of the Mobile Services Division, observed that "[i]f a security
interest holder were to foreclose on the collateral license, by operation of law, the license
could transfer hands without the prior approval of the Commission." Id. While this is only
an explanatory observation, it appears to be inconsistent with the automatic forfeiture doctrine. Perfection Music, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order,46 F.C.C.2d 635, 30 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 12 (1974).
75. Walter 0 Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. 986, 74 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1031. In doing so the
Commission was aligning itself with the opinion in In re Ridgely Communications, Inc.,
139 B.R. 374, 379-80 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992), recognizing the validity of security interests in
a broadcast license limited to the licensee's proprietary rights in relation to third parties
(e.g., the creditor's right to receive proceeds of sale of the license) and rejecting the district
court's analysis in the Tak ruling.
76. See, e.g., In re Thomas Comm., Inc., 166 B.R. 846, 848-49 (S.D.W.Va. 1994)
(finding that security interest in proceeds of sale of license does not threaten bankrupt licensee's right to transfer its license freely or its relationship with the FCC).
77. PBR Comm. Sys., Inc., Memorandum Opinion, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1336
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994). This distinction has proven decisive in respect to other forms of
governmental licensure as well; see, e.g., Freightliner Mkt. Dev. Corp. v. Silver Wheel
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traditionally held that licensees have no true ownership interest in their
broadcast licenses," but developing case law recognizes that a security interest in the proceeds of sale does not contravene FCC authority. 78 If this
proves to be the prevailing view, as it should, the creation of a security inof an FCC-approved sale, should be
terest, albeit limited to the proceeds
79
deemed valid and enforceable.
E.

Reversionary Interests

Closely related to the question of security interests is that of reversionary rights. As noted above, licensees cannot assign or transfer their licenses without Commission approval. A contractual right for the seller to
call back a license for breach of contract by the buyer, once it has been assigned or transferred, would undermine the Commission's power. Here
again, the Commission emphasizes that a license does not confer a property right but only a valuable, though limited, privilege to utilize the airwaves. Once having disposed of such privilege pursuant to FCC approval,
the prior licensee cannot by contract establish any rights of reversion if, for
example, the new licensee fails to make agreed-upon payments to the assignor or transferor.' To hold otherwise, the Commission has noted, would
be to deprive it of its statutorily mandated opportunity to pass upon the
public interest qualifications of any new (i.e., reverted) licensee. Nor does
it seem to matter that in such cases the reversion will have gone to, by
definition, a Commission licensee in the past. Whatever the strength of the
Commission's logic in this respect, it has consistently, and down to the
present day, denied parties to a license assignment or a license transfer any
rights to automatically unwind or void the movement of the license. 8'
Logically, a contractual provision providing for reversion but subject to
Commission approval would appear to be consistent with law. The em-

Freightlines, Inc., 823 F. 2d 362 (9th Cir. 1987).
78. In re Beach TV Partners, 38 F.3d 535, 537 (11th Cir. 1994).
79. But see Federal Communications Bar Association, Report of the Subcommittee on
Legal Opinions of the TransactionalPractice Committee of the Federal Communications
Bar Association, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 389, 419 (1996) (stating in a sample opinion letter
that "the FCC and various federal courts have held that the attempted creation of a security
interest in a license issued by the FCC is neither valid nor enforceable.").
80. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1150(b) (1996).
81. See, e.g., Radio KDAN, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 F.C.C.2d 934,
12 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 584, reconsiderationdenied by Memorandum Opinion and Order,
13 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 100 (1968), affd sub nom. W.H. Hansen v. FCC, 413 F.2d 374
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (finding that mortgage clause granting prior licensee the right to act as present licensee's attorney-in-fact upon default is void ab initio because it attempts to retain
reversionary interest for prior licensee).
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phatically prohibitive language in the FCC's rules,82 however, appears to
reject even this. As noted above, the Commission has been asked to revisit
its long-standing policy in this area and has been considering the matter
since 1992.83

F.

The Bankruptcy Context

1.

In General

Like other businesses, those licensed by the FCC occasionally find
themselves in bankruptcy proceedings. Licensees' property rights in their
licenses are often disputed in such circumstances. There are numerous respects in which the intersection of the Communications Act and the bankruptcy laws requires thoughtful integration of conflicting or at least divergent legal and policy objectives. In older cases one finds the Commission
imperiously asserting its plenary and absolute power to deal with its licensees, while in recent years a recognition of the need for and desirability of
accommodation between the two bodies of law has been evident. In Dale
J. Parsons,Jr., the Commission acknowledged that it has an affirmative
obligation to "reconcile its policies under the Communications Act with
the policies of other federal laws and statutes, including the federal bankruptcy laws .... ""
Commission case law requires that the filing of a bankruptcy petition
be reported as an involuntary transfer of control," and generally such applications are routinely granted, either to a trustee or a debtor-inpossession. While normally the FCC would exercise virtually plenary supervisory power over the disposition of a license, once a bankruptcy pro82. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1150(a) (stating that in transferring broadcast license, licensee
may retain no right to reversion of license). The Commission has, however, accepted reversionary rights in a transfer which were carefully crafted so as to leave the transferor with
rights to less than a controlling interest, provided that the controlling block was to be disposed of through a public or private sale rather than to the transferor by contract. Joseph F.
Bryant, Memorandum Opinionand Order,6 FCC Rcd. 6121, 70 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 171
(1991).
83. Investment in the Brdcst. Indus., Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Notice of
Inquiry, 7 FCC Rcd. 2654 (1992).
84. Dale J. Parsons, Jr., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 2718, para.
11, 77 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 776 (1995); see also Implementation of Section 309G) of the
Comm. Act-Competitive Bidding, Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd.
403, para. 135, 76 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 945 (1994) (assuming transferee is qualified,
Commission will continue generally to defer to bankruptcy laws on many matters); La Rose
v. FCC, 494 F.2d 1145, 1146-47 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating that agencies must be alert to
determine whether their policies might conflict with other federal policies and if so, whether
such conflict can be minimized).
85. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 24.839(a).
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ceeding has been initiated the bankruptcy court acquires substantial powers
with respect to the bankruptcy estate. For example, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a)(3)
prohibits any act "to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate" 86 after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. A bankruptcy court, through the
district court, has exclusive jurisdiction over all property of the estate.
Eleven U.S.C. § 105(a) provides that the bankruptcy court has authority to
enter any order or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions of the bankruptcy law.88
Because an FCC license itself is generally among the more valuable
assets of a licensee, the question has frequently arisen whether the bankruptcy court can assert dominion over the license as it would over other
bankruptcy estate assets. A number of the most thoughtful judicial opinions concerning the existence or status of licensee property rights have
been written in bankruptcy cases addressing these issues. Some bankruptcy
courts have treated an FCC license as "property of the estate" under § 541
of the Bankruptcy Code.8 9 Others, however, have taken the contrary view., 0
It would appear that a sensible reading of the Communications Act and the
Bankruptcy Act is readily at hand whether or not the license is considered
as bankruptcy estate property: any disposition of a license by a bankruptcy
court should be subject to ultimate FCC approval to be sought by the bankruptcy trustee through application to the Commission. Just such a sensible
accommodation was adopted in In re Pacific Land Sales, Inc.,9' in which
the court upheld a bankruptcy court's injunction which prohibited parties
from interfering with the operation of an FM radio station, but permitted
them to appear before the FCC. The court indicated that outside the FCC's
exclusive licensing power, the bankruptcy court has authority to enjoin
parties from taking action.92
2.

Government as Creditor
The degree to which a bankruptcy creditor can assert and protect its

86. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 § 362, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1994) (amended
1994).
87. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (1994) (as amended by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394 § 104(b), 108 Stat. 4106, 4109).
88. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
89. Id. § 541(a). See, e.g., In re Fugazy Express, Inc., 124 B.R. 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y.
1991), appeal dismissed, 982 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1992).
90. See, e.g., In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co., 35 B.R. 400, 401 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1983) (holding that an FCC license is not property of debtor's estate).
91. In re Pacific Land Sales, Inc., 187 B.R. 302 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995).
92. Id. at 313-14.
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rights to the security represented by the license is particularly interesting in
cases where the U.S. government is itself the creditor. In In re Atlantic
Business and Community Development Corp.,93 the government, on behalf
of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), contended that an FCC license has
certain attributes of property arising from the procedural safeguards applicable to alteration, revocation or suspension of the license. The court held
that the IRS could assert the rights of a lien holder with respect to a radio
license under § 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code, at least with respect to
a lien on the proceeds of sale. It observed that the Commission's normal
concern-that the allowance of traditional property rights in a license
would undercut the public trustee concept of a radio licensee-was mitigated where the government itself was the lien holder. More recently, the
Commission has addressed its own rights as a primary creditor and those
of subordinated creditors in instances in which an auction-winning licensee
borrows money from the U.S. Treasury pursuant to rules which provide a
stretched-out period for designated entities to pay winning auction bids.94
In fact the government's interest as creditor has become a hotly contested matter in the context of the Commission's Personal Communication
Services (PCS) C and F Block auctions. In the spring of 1997 a number of
PCS auction winners claimed variously that circumstances compelled them
to seek relief from the auction payment rules. 5 Certain of these parties
contended that, if the Commission did not soften its payment terms for the
portion of the winning bids which had been deferred under the applicable
auction rules, licensee bankruptcies would inevitably occur.9 6 Such bankruptcies, the parties noted, would lead to delays in the FCC's ability to
cancel the licenses granted to the defaulting parties while a bankruptcy
court asserted its prerogatives under the bankruptcy law. These proceedings, the parties observed, would interfere with the reauctioning of the licenses and with the FCC's plan to initiate competitive wireless offerings
on the C and F Blocks as quickly as possible. The Commission thereupon
sought public comment on the issues posed by these circumstances, in-

93. In re Atlantic Bus. and Community Dev. Corp., 994 F.2d 1069, 1073-75 (3d Cir.
1993).
94. See Letter from William E. Kennard, FCC Gen. Counsel, and Michele C. Farquhar,
Chief, Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, to Leonard J. Kennedy, Esq., and Richard S. Denning,
Esq., Dow, Lohnes & Albertson, 11 FCC Rcd. 21,572 (1996).
95. See Wireless Telecomm. Bureau Seeks Comment on Broadband PCS C and F
Block Installment Payment Issues, Public Notice, WT Docket 97-82, 1997 WL 291808
(FCC June 2, 1997) [hereinafter InstallmentPayment Issues Pub. Notice].
96. One winning PCS license holder has already entered bankruptcy proceedings. See
Pocket Seeks Chapter11 Bankruptcy Protection,TELECOMM. REP., April 7, 1997, at 13.
97. See Installment PaymentIssues Pub. Notice, WT Docket 97-82, 1997 WL 291808.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

cluding a public forum to ventilate the issues." Chairman Hundt, however,
reacted quickly and forcefully to the potential bankruptcy delays. While
seeking legislation from Congress to codify his views," the Chairman, at
least for himself, attempted to rewrite a good deal of the case law, both at
the Commission and in the courts, which is discussed above. ,

G.

Modification

Limitations on the licensee's rights, however, go far beyond those
imposed on its ability to dispose of its license or to use it to secure loans. It
is well settled that the Commission has the power to modify existing licenses as necessary in its ongoing administration of the Act. As 47 U.S.C.
§ 316 simply states:
Any station license or construction permit may be modified by the
Commission either for a limited time or for the duration of the term
thereof, if in the judgment of the Commission such action will promote
the public interest, convenience, and necessity, or the provisions of this
[Act] or of any treaty ratified by the United States will be more fully

98. See Agenda for Pub. Forum regarding Broadband PCS C and F Block Installment
Payment Issues, PublicNotice, WT Docket 97-82, 1997 WL 355535 (FCC June 27, 1997).
99. See Letter from Reed Hundt, FCC Chairman, to Rep. John R. Kasich (July 16,
1997) (on file with author) (stating that the FCC should be given explicit authority to revoke and reacution licenses held by firms in bankruptcy notwithstanding provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code); FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, Speech to the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of
Commerce (July 17, 1997) (transcript available in
<http:www.fcc.govlDaily_ReleaseslBusiness/1997/db970718/spreh740.txt>); FCC Chairman Reed Hundt Calls on Congress to Protect Spectrum Licenses From Bankruptcy Law
Delays (July 17, 1997)
<http://www.fcc.govlBureauslMiscellaneouslNewsReleases/1 997/ntmc705 1.txt>
(Unofficial announcement of the FCC) (forwarding proposed language to this effect for insertion into pending legislation).
100. As succinctly stated by the Chairman, Congress should spell out:
the plain, irrefutable fact that the public's airwaves belong to the public, and any
bankrupt licensee and its other creditors has [sic] absolutely no right whatsoever
to hold, retain, litigate about, or delay the revocation of any license when that licensee has not paid monies it promised to the American people.

FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, Speech to the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, 5
(released July 18, 1997) <http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/Spreh740.html>. If these
views are intended to summarize existing law, they are mistaken. If they are a proposal to
alter existing doctrine, they would at the least require careful analysis. In either case the
Chairman's remarks were cast in an unusually derogatory fashion. In the same speech,
Hundt urged Congress to:
make it crystal clear to even the most ingenious pettifogging lawyers that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code: (1) are not applicable to any FCC license for
which a payment obligation is owed; (2) do not relieve any licensee from payment obligations, and (3) do not affect the Commission's authority to revoke,
cancel, transfer, or assign its licenses.
Id. at 10.
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complied with.' 0'
On its face this provision gives the Commission essentially unlimited
power to change the rules of the road, provided only that the licensee affected by any such modification is given an opportunity to present its
views on the proposed modification to the Commission in a timely fashion.
The Commission has relied on § 316 to modify adversely the authority granted to licensees on countless occasions; the courts have in the vast
majority of instances affirmed such withdrawals or diminutions of authority, even when--as is most often the case-affected parties do not receive
individual or trial type hearings, but only the protections of rule making.'2
This is true even when the underlying statute-section 316(a) of the Actprovides that no order of modification shall become final until the affected
licensee has had an opportunity to show cause by public hearing that such
modification should not occur. 1 3

The ability to modify existing authorizations is clearly at the core of
the statutory responsibility of a quasi-legislative body. In effect, it is the
Commission's fundamental grant of authority to continuously review and
revise public interest determinations in -light of ever changing circumstances and to modify existing grants as necessary to effectuate such forward-looking determinations. ""'Cumulative experience" begets understanding and insight by which judgments... are validated or qualified or
101. 47 U.S.C. § 316(a)(1) (1994).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Storer Brdcst. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 197, 205 (1956)
(stating that the Commission can adopt concentration of ownership rules and dismiss summarily nonconforming applications). The Storerdecision, one of the most venerable in the
field of administrative law, is properly cited in the context of the Commission's power to
alter existing license rights because the Commission's decision affected existing business
affairs of Storer as well as the opportunity to file applications for additional broadcast licenses. Id. at 199; see also Telocator Network of Am. v. FCC, 691 F.2d 525, 551 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (stating that Commission may utilize its rulemaking power in lieu of adjudication
when the factual issues are legislative and have prospective effect and classwide applicability); WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, 618 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub non.
WBEN, Inc. v. FCC, 393 U.S. 914 (1968) (holding Commission can amend its rules governing presunrise operation of AM radio stations even if doing so reduces audience of existing licensees). The Telocator opinion collects numerous citations to cases addressing the
Commission's power to proceed by rule making. Telocator, 691 F.2d at 551-52. It is worth
noting, however, that the Commission's authority to act by rule making is not unbounded
and, particularly in respect to consideration of new, mutually exclusive applications, the
Commission must be careful not to violate rights protected by Ashbacker Radio Corp. v.
FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945). See Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 928 F.2d 428, 450, 452
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
103. California Citizens Band Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43, 52 (9th Cir. 1967);
see also Federal Power Comm'n. v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964). Section 316 has been
amended since the WBEN decision to remove the reference to a public hearing. See FCC
Authorization Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-214, sec. 4, 97 Stat. 1467, 1467-68 (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 316(a) (1994)).
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invalidated. The constant process of trial and error, on a wider and fuller
scale than a single adversary litigation permits, differentiates perhaps more
than anything else the administrative from the judicial process."'' 0 4 The
Commission has not only the right to do this, but the obligation. 5 The
fundamental power to alter existing licenses was perhaps most clearly articulated in a case not involving the FCC: American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil
AeronauticsBoard, 'o6in which Judge Leventhal emphasized that, provided
the process is not a subterfuge to attack one particular licensee (or, in
American Airlines, a certificated carrier),'1° rule making under section 4 of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) °8 is entirely adequate procedurally to amend existing authority even in the presence of a provision in
the Federal Aviation Act requiring an adjudicatory hearing before an aviation certificate could be modified.'9 This power to proceed by rule making
applies to existing as well as to new authority. As noted by Judge Leventhal:
Petitioners argue that the Storer doctrine is restricted to regulations affecting future applications for new licenses... [but] such a restrictive
reading of the Storer doctrine is unwarranted .... [T]he Storer doctrine is not to be revised or reshaped by reference to fortuitous circumstances. It rests on a fundamental awareness that rule making is a vital
part of the administrative process, particularly adapted to and needful
for sound evolution of policy in guiding the future development of industries subject to intensive administrative regulation in the public interest, and.., such rule making is not to be shackled, in the absence of
clear and specific Congressional requirement, by importation of formalities developed for the adjudicatory process and basically unsuited
for policy rule making.110
The D.C. Circuit has recently reaffirmed that while modification of a class
of licenses by rule making is consistent with law, the FCC "cannot, merely
by invoking its rulemaking authority, avoid the adjudicatory procedures
required for granting and modifying individual licenses." .
104. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975) (quoting NLRB v. SevenUp Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953)).
105. Storer Brdcst., 351 U.S. at 203-05; NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225
(1943); Florida Cellular Mobil Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 28 F.3d 191, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1357 (1995).
106. American Airlines, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
843 (1966).
107. See also Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Delta Airlines, 367 U.S. 316 (1961) (stating that
individual route certificates cannot be altered without a hearing).
108. Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (1994).
109. American Airlines, 359 F.2d at 628, 631.
110. Id. at 628-29 (citations and footnotes omitted).

111. Committee For Effective Cellular Rules v. FCC, 53 F.3d 1309, 1318 (D.C. Cir.
1995). A fortiori the mere expectation of receiving an FCC license may be foreclosed by
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Nevertheless, while the Commission's power under § 316 is vast, it is
not unbounded. Modifications must be rationally related to a legitimate
statutory purpose and free of individual or punitive effect. The presence of
a waiver provision has been deemed crucial." 2 The Commission must provide a reasoned analysis for the change in policy. "' Agencies may not justify a change in interpretation of mandate by relying merely on shifts in
political mood or new political philosophies.14 In addition, the courts traditionally have examined closely the retroactive effect of certain policy
modifications." 5
Before proceeding to address how the courts have interpreted and applied the property rights of FCC licensees, a brief pause to comment on the
Commission's property doctrines is in order. One can fairly say that those
doctrines are largely muddled and rarely, if ever, based on empirical evidence that a social scientist would find persuasive. While the Commission
denounces the purchase of a broadcast license for profit or resale, there is
no reason to accept the assumption that such motives are contrary to the
public interest, degrade the public service performance of broadcasters, or
in any other significant way abuse the status of a licensee. Indeed, given
the capitalistic economy in which we live, one would have thought that
classical principles of market trading would be considered admirable
rather than deplorable. The Commission has adopted numerous rules and
policies limiting the freedom of action of licensees but only infrequently
has it rejected license applications for violation of such rules, denied transfer or renewal, or otherwise punished licensees or applicants for behavior
deemed inconsistent with the plethora of rules establishing standards of
character or performance. The heavy-handed and self-righteous rejection
of "trafficking" calls to mind far more serious and malevolent behavior,
such as dealing in controlled substances, or even, less dramatically, the unease with which a preindustrial society viewed emerging mercantile activity. Regrettably, the 1934 Act itself encourages hostility, or at least anxiety
about profit maximizing, by requiring the Commission to adopt regulations
designed to preclude trafficking in licenses won at auction." 6 Using the institution of spectrum auctions as a crystallizing factor, the Commission
rule making. Id.
112. WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, 618 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
WBEN, Inc. v. FCC, 393 U.S. 914 (1968).
113. Greater Boston TV Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 923 (1971).
114. National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 775 F.2d 342, 356 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
115. See infraPartIV.
116. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934 ch. 652, § 3090)(4)(E), 48 Stat. 1064, 1085
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309 (j)(4)(E) (1994)).
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should reconsider and seriously reevaluate its historic hesitation to acknowledge that licensees have--and should have-substantial property
rights.

III. DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE
Part II of this Article describes the limits which exist on the property
rights of FCC licensees in their licenses. Given the extent of these limitations, especially the agency's very broad authority to alter prior policy, can
licensees rely on prior Commission policy and use such reliance to limit or
defeat otherwise lawful agency action? Alternatively, are licensees' prerogatives so limited that detrimental reliance, as it is understood in everyday commercial law, has little or no relevance?
There are three separate theories which may be applicable to the issue
of limits on agencies' powers to modify authorizations: constitutional limits, limits imposed by equitable estoppel, and limits related to a theory of
contract.
A.

ConstitutionalLimitations

The two principal constitutional protections addressed in case law are
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause. If
agency action is consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act, there is
no basis to claim a due process violation." 7 It is also difficult to make a
takings argument. Certainly where the matter complained of is congressional action, the courts have not been very sympathetic, and the same
principles apply to administrative action which is consistent with enabling
law. Congress itself is free to readjust rights and burdens even if doing so
upsets prior expectations and even if the effect of legislation is to impose a
new liability on prior acts." 8 "Those who do business in the regulated field
cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent
amendments to achieve the legislative end."" 9 As stated earlier in Fleming
v. Rhodes: "Federal regulation of future action based upon rights previously acquired by the person regulated is not prohibited by the Constitution. So long as the Constitution authorizes the subsequently enacted legislation, the fact that its provisions limit or interfere with previously
acquired rights does not condemn it.""'2 In one of the early seminal cases
117. The Due Process Clause is not violated by amendments of authority imposed without trial type hearings. See Air Lines Pilots Ass'n., Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 896 (2d
Cir. 1960).
118. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16 (1976).
119. FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84,91 (1958).
120. Fleming, 331 U.S. 100, 107 (1947). As formulated in Usery, due process may im-

Number 1]

PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER 1934 ACT

involving licensee rights prior to the 1934 Act, the Supreme Court held
that broadcast licensees have no prescriptive right against the subsequent
exercise by Congress of its commerce clause powers to delete a station to
achieve geographical distribution of broadcast service. 2 ' The Commission
may act at the direction of Congress to eliminate the mere expectation of
receiving a license without creating a constitutional problem.'2
In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., the Court indicated
that it has consistently declined to adopt any set formula for identifying a
"taking" forbidden by the Fifth Amendment, relying instead on ad hoc,
factual inquiries into the circumstances of each case.' 23 Nevertheless, the
Court sets forth three particularly significant factors: "(1) 'the economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant'; (2) 'the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations';
and (3) 'the character of the governmental action."" 24 More specifically,
the Taking Clause is inapplicable to circumstances in which the regulatee
has no property right which is entitled to constitutional protection. In Peterson v. Department of the Interior,the court rejected a claim that water
districts had constitutionally protected vested rights to subsidized water
contracts based on a "reasonable investment-backed expectation" tied to
U.S. government representations made in such contracts. 26 The court rejected the notion that a constitutionally protected property interest "can be
spun out of the yarn of investment-backed expectations," indicating that it
must first be established that a property right exists, and that such right
cannot be fashioned solely out of such expectations.' This is not to say
that investment-backed expectations are irrelevant to constitutional challenges to governmentally imposed impairment of property rights. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Court observed that such expectations are
among the factors relevant to a determination whether governmental action

pose higher standards for retroactive than for prospective legislation. Usery, 428 U.S. at 17.
121. Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros., 289 U.S. 266, 282 (1933).
122. Multi-State Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 728 F. 2d 1519, 1526 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also
Motor and Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F. 2d 1095, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied
sub nom. General Motors Corp. v. Costle, 446 U.S. 952 (1980) (explaining that state regulations which limit amount of maintenance required from motor vehicle purchasers in connection with enforcement of emission standards warranties are not unconstitutional merely
because state's underlying rationale does not meet with vehicle manufacturers' expectations
or desires).
123. Connolly, 475 U.S. 211,224 (1986).
124. Id. at 224-25 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978)).
125. Peterson, 899 F.2d 799, 812-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1003 (1990).
126. Id. at 813.
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has gone beyond regulation and effects a taking.'2 The key, therefore, remains the presence of a property right. But even if such right exists, the
weight of authority seems to suggest that regulatory action which is within
the ambit of the enabling statute
and which complies with the APA is pre28
sumptively constitutional.
B.

Equitable Estoppel

Detrimental reliance, as an essential element of promissory or equitable estoppel, is a long-standing and widely recognized basis on which to
assert legal or equitable claims. 29 As described in section 90(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, promissory estoppel comprehends the
making of a promise as to future conduct, on which the promisor should
reasonably expect the promisee to substantially rely, and on which the
promisee does in fact rely. Such a promise is enforceable if necessary to
avoid injustice. Of course, for a claim of detrimental reliance to be cognizable, there must be a property interest, or right, which has been extinguished or impaired.
The extent to which promissory estoppel (or equitable estoppel) lies
against the government is not at all clear. In Heckler v. Community Health
Services of Crawford County, Inc.,3' the Court indicated in dictum that

while it is well settled that the government cannot be estopped on the same

127. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (noting that the factors in such a determination include interference of the governmental action with reasonable investment-backed
expectations).
128. These principles were recently applied in In re Jones Truck Lines, Inc., 57 F.3d 642
(8th Cir. 1995), a case arising in the motor carrier field but relevant to FCC regulatees. In
Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116 (1990), the Supreme
Court had ruled that long-standing Interstate Commerce Commission practice permitting
motor carriers to charge rates other than those filed with the agency was unlawful. There
followed a rash of proceedings in which motor carrier trustees in bankruptcy sought to collect from shippers the difference between the filed rates and the lower rates actually negotiated and charged. In response, Congress passed the Negotiated Rates Act (NRA) which
curtailed such suits. After entering bankruptcy, Jones, a trucking company, sought to have
the NRA declared unconstitutional insofar as it impaired Jones's prior right to seek additional payment from shippers in "undercharge" claims. Applying the Supreme Court's tripartite test, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the NRA did not effect an unconstitutional
taking. The court noted that the NRA did not physically invade Jones's property nor procure it for the government's own use; rather it arose from a "public program that adjusts the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." In re Jones Truck
Lines, 57 F.3d at 650. Nor did the court agree that Jones had been deprived of a legitimate
expectation that it would be able to collect the undercharges, observing that the pendency of
legislation adjusting the law in response to Maislin was well known. Id. at 650-5 1.
129. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981).
130. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51 (1984).
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terms as any other litigant,"' the question whether estoppel may ever run
against the government, and if so under what circumstances, is left open. 2
Cases cited in the Court's opinion strongly suggest that if estoppel does lie
against the government it is only for affirmative misconduct or defalcations in the administration of the law, rather than for properly adopted
shifts in administrative rules or regulations. One such class of potential applications, however, includes government deception or misleading of private parties. In this context, the Court observed that this line of cases
"underlies the doctrine that an administrative agency may not apply a new
rule retroactively when to do so would unduly intrude upon reasonable reliance interests."'33
Neither NLRB v. Bell Aerospace nor Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. Wichita Board of Trade appear to support the Court's reliance on them. In Bell Aerospace the Court suggested that if adverse consequences ensuing from industry reliance on past decisions of the National
Labor Relations Board (Board) were substantial, the Board might be precluded from revising its views in an adjudication.' 4 It rejected preclusion
on the facts before it, observing also that the case did not involve a new
liability imposed on individuals for past actions taken in good faith reliance on prior Board pronouncements, nor fines or damages.'35 However,
the Court's decision did not squarely address these issues nor announce
any clear rules of law applicable to such circumstances. The decision in
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. does little more in respect to
reliance issues than to reiterate that an agency's change in path must be
articulated and to announce a presumption that congressional policy is best
carried out when an agency adheres to settled policy.'36 SEC v. Chenery
Corp., of course, merely articulates the need for balancing the interests of
public policy (such as consistency with statutory design) against the injury
done to the party relying on prior law when a new standard is applied ret-

131. See generally Gibson v. Resolution Trust Corp., 51 F.3d 1016, 1025 (11th Cir.
1995) (stating that equitable estoppel as a defense to a federal cause of action lies only in
the most extreme circumstances); FDIC v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 1489 (10th Cir. 1994)
(stating that application of the estoppel doctrine against the government may be invoked
only when doing so does not frustrate the purpose of federal statutes or unduly undermine
their enforcement).
132. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. at 60.
133. Id. at 60 n.12 (citing, inter alia, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295
(1974); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 80708 (1973) (plurality opinion); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947)).
134. BellAerospace, 416 U.S. at 295.
135. Id.
136. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 412 U.S. at 807-08.
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roactvely.' More recently, the Court has implied that the use of equitable
estoppel against the government is an extraordinary remedy.'38 And a lower
court, citing Community Health Services and Office of Personnel Management, has noted that while the Court has left open the possibility of estoppel against the government, it has yet to uphold a decision which estops
the government.139
C.

The ContractDimension

Because the FCC, in adopting and amending its rules, acts only as a
sovereign and it is undisputed that an FCC license is not a contract between the licensee and the Commission,"'n there is no occasion to consider
whether liability of a contractual nature exists. 4' Nevertheless, brief mention of this dimension of the issue is justified. When the government acts
as a contracting party rather than as a sovereign, the Court has held it to
the letter of its undertaking. 42 In Bowen v. PublicAgencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment (POSSE), the Court dealt with the claim that a
statute which had the effect of denying states the right to withdraw from
social security coverage even though they had previously had the right to
do so was an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.' Appellants argued that the previous right to withdraw from the coverage was
a valuable property right which Congress could not abolish retroactively.
The Court denied the claim, noting that the "contractual right" bore "little,
if any, resemblance to rights held to constitute 'property' within the

137. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 203.
138. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Isaac, 18 F.3d 1492, 1498 (10th Cir. 1994)
(citing Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 421-22 (1990) for the
proposition that the Supreme Court therein alerted the judiciary that equitable estoppel
against the government is an extraordinary remedy).
139. Id. at 1498-99.
140. Petition for Reconsideration of Comm'n's Action in License Renewal Applications
of Certain TV Stations Licensed for and Serving Los Angeles, CA, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 72 F.C.C.2d 273, para. 10, 45 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1295 (1979), vacated and
remanded in part sub nom. Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297 (1981), reversed sub nom.
Community TV v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498 (1983).
141. Cf.Hughes Comm. Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 998 F.2d 953, 958-59 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (holding the government financially responsible to commercial satellite company under satellite launch services contract for changes in policy triggered by sovereign government action).
142. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S.Ct. 2432 (1996), in which the Court
held the government contractually liable for damages which arose when Congress amended
the law, so as to deny certain financial institutions regulatory treatment to which the government had contractually committed itself.
143. POSSE, 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
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meaning of the Fifth Amendment."' 44 The Court also noted that the prior
statutory right to withdraw constituted neither a debt of the United States
nor an obligation of the United States to provide benefits under a contract
for which the obligee paid a monetary premium. "Rather the provision
simply was part of a regulatory program over which Congress retained
authority , to
amend in the exercise of its power to provide for the general
, 45
welfare.
But even in the absence of relief predicated on constitutional, estoppel or contract principles, the courts appear willing to consider claims of
detrimental reliance on the part of FCC licensees. Typical is Reuters Ltd. v.
FCC, in which the court held that licensees have a "vested interest [that]
14
must be given due weight in any consideration of fundamental fairness.'
There are also cases which recognize that mere applicants-or even
merely adversarial parties-by following the Commission's rules may
have enforceable reliance interests, irrespective of any license rights.
These cases arise most often in the context of the Commission's "cut-off'
rules.'47 In National Ass'n of Broadcastersv. FCC, the court provided an
extensive discussion of the permissible limits of retroactivity in administrative decision making.141 Of the criteria enumerated by the court, "[b]y
far the most important consideration.., is the extent of justifiable reliance
on the old rule."' 49 The Commission itself has confirmed on many
occa50
sions that reliance interests are entitled to careful consideration.

144. Id. at 55.
145. Id.; cf National Treasury Employees Union v. Reagan, 663 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (rejecting a Fifth Amendment challenge to the government's withdrawal of job offers
following appointment but prior to employment). "The mere existence of a revocable appointment does not [create] an entitlement." Id. at 248-49.
146. Reuters, 781 F.2d 946, 950 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
147. See, e.g., McElroy Elec. Corp. v. FCC, 86 F.3d 248, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting
that timely filers who diligently comply with FCC requirements have an equitable interest
in enforcement of the cut-off rules); Florida Inst. of Tech. v. FCC, 952 F.2d 549, 554 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (noting that timely applicants have a legitimate expectation that cut-off rules will
be enforced, as well as an equitable interest); Orange Park Fla. T.V., Inc. v. FCC, 811 F.2d
664, 674 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating "[tihe Commission's well-known recognition of a
renewal expectancy that leads applicants to vie for licenses which, if awarded, will require
significant expenditure of resources.").
148. National Ass'n of Brdcsts., 554 F.2d 1118, 1130-32 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
149. Id. at 1132. Professor Feinman has suggested that the principal issue in applying
promissory estoppel is whether the promisor has made a promise justifying the promisee's
reliance. Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV.
678, 690 (1984).
150. See, e.g., Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Comm. Act-Competitive Bidding, Memorandum Opinion and Order,9 FCC Rcd. 7387, para. 13, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 843 (1994) (refusing to subject to auction pending applications filed prior to enactment
of section 3090) because applications had originally been filed "in reliance on the Commis-
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The Second Circuit has applied a detrimental reliance analysis to bar
the Commission from imposing, on too short notice, a change in its Prime
Time Access Rule (PTAR). In National Ass'n of Independent Television
Producers & Distributors(NAITPD) v. FCC,the court rejected the FCC's
claim that independent program producers were not entitled to more than
eight months notice of a change in the Commission's rules which would
curtail the market for their program products.' The court noted that:
[P]etitioners had good reason to rely on their status under the rule. The
FCC did not merely acquiesce in petitioners' activities, it invited and
encouraged them. Part of the avowed purpose of PTAR was to urge
independents to produce programs for prime time and to foster a
healthy syndication industry.... Having justifiably relied on the
Commission's prior polic, petitioners are entitled to more opportunity
to adjust to the new rule.
The court distinguished General Telephone Co. v. United States, which
sustained a change in Commission rules affecting existing regulatees,' on
the ground that the petitioners there should not have relied on the Commission's acquiescence in their activities because the Commission had hinted

sion's existing lottery procedures"); accord Amendment of Parts 21 and 74 of the
Comm'n's Rules, Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 9589, paras. 89-90, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 856, reconsiderationgranted in part and denied in part by Memorandum Opinion and
order on Reconsideration, 10 FCC Rcd. 13821, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1995); see also
Review of the Pioneer's Preference Rules and Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules To Establish New Personal Comm. Servs., Memorandum Opinion and Order on Remand, 9 FCC
Rcd. 4055, para. 13, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1088 (1994) (requiring pre-auction recipients
of pioneer's preferences to pay for their licenses, and declining to recognize recipients' request that free licenses be granted as reward for investments and information disclosures
made in reliance on their expectation of a preference); Anchor Brdcst. Ltd. Partnership,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 4566, para. 149, 70 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1569 (1992), modified by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 1674, 72 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 98, reversed and remanded sub nom. Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875 (1993).
In reconsidering the extent to which the "integration" factor was relevant in comparative
broadcast hearings, FCC decided that any new policy should not be applied to hearings already in progress since "applicants in hearing relied on the 1965 Policy Statement in formulating their applications and have incurred significant expenses litigating proposals that
potentially could be rendered inferior by a drastically new policy. We do not believe that
this result would be justified under the circumstances here." Id. para. 22 (footnote omitted);
see also Fox TV Stations, Inc., Second Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd.
5714, para. 24-28, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1294 (1995); DBS Report and Order, 11 FCC
Rcd. 9712, para. 74, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 928 (1995) (rejecting restrictive crossownership rules because industry has made investments at least in part in reliance on earlier
decision), aff'd sub nom. DirecTV, Inc. v. FCC, 110 F.3d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
151. NAITPD, 502 F.2d 249, 254-55 (2d Cir. 1974) (frequently cited erroneously in
D.C. Circuit opinions as a D.C. Circuit proceeding; see, e.g., Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78
F.3d 620, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
152. Id. at 255.
153. General Tel., 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971).
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for years that it might curtail them."5
The extent to which an FCC licensee may claim detrimental reliance
also arose in connection with the Commission's decision in late 1995 to
auction certain Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) channels that it had previously indicated it would allocate among certain conditional DBS permittees whose initial channel requests could not be granted. In Continental
Satellite Corp., the Commission found that it did not have a sufficient
number of DBS channels to award each applicant the sixteen requested.
The Commission granted eleven channels to each applicant, but indicated
that if any of the DBS permittees forfeited its channels the Commission
would reallocate those channels among the remaining eligible DBS permittees 55 In 1995 the Commission cancelled the DBS channels previously
awarded to another DBS permittee for lack of due diligence.'56 Instead of
reallocating the newly available channels, the Commission determined that
the public interest would be better served by auctioning the fifty-one channels to the highest bidder.'57 A number of the disappointed DBS permittees-eligible for additional channels under the original reallocation policy-argued that they had detrimentally relied on the Commission's earlier
154. NAITPD, 502 F.2d at 255; see also Omnipoint, 78 F.3d at 633 (sustaining Commission's weighing of reliance interests of one group of affected parties in modifying its rules);
New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 826 F.2d 1101, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding no evidence of telephone companies' detrimental reliance on their understanding of FCC's prior
rate-of-return policy), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1039 (1989); RKO Gen., Inc. v. FCC, 670
F.2d 215, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (under certain circumstances an agency may be prevented
from applying a new policy retroactively to parties who detrimentally relied on the previous
policy), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982). Omnipoint relies on NAITPD, stating that the
holding is that "the Commission was required to take into account petitioners' justifiable
reliance upon old rule when enacting new rule." Omnipoint, 78 F.3d at 633. This is not an
accurate characterization of the NAITPD holding, since the Commission had given consideration in its decision to the reliance factor. Rather, the NAITPD court concluded that the
Commission had erred in adopting an eight month transition period, and the holding is that
given the justifiable reliance shown in the record, petitioners were entitled to a longer adjustment period. The NAITPD record revealed the overwhelming support of the commenters
for a transition period longer than the one adopted by the Commission. The court noted also
the existence of an FCC rule of a similar nature but which allowed a longer transition period
than permitted in the case before the court. The NAITPD court's holding, then, may be confined to the Commission's evident misreading or disregard of the record.
155. Continental Satellite Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 6292,
para. 54, 66 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1185 (1989), partial reconsiderationdenied by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 5 FCC Rcd. 7421 (1990), reconsiderationand clarification
grantedin part and denied in part sub nom. Petition and Application of Tempo Satellite,
Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order,7 FCC Rcd. 6597 (1992).
156. Advanced Comm. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 3399, 1
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 276 (1995), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Advanced Comm. Corp. v.
FCC, 84 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert.denied, 117 S. Ct. 718 (1997).
157. DBS Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 9712, para. 165, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 928
(1995), affd sub nom. DirecTV, Inc. v. FCC, 110 F.3d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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promise of channel reallocations. Three of these parties contended that
they had spent many millions of dollars and built spacecraft with more
than eleven transponders in reliance on the Commission's 1989 promise to
give them additional channels if any were to become available."" This
promise, they contended, imbued them with "vested rights"'' 9 once the
contingency (of the availability of additional DBS channels) was fulfilled.
The Commission rejected these arguments, finding that while the
permittees did have a claim under the prior (pre-auction) regime amounting to rights to reclaimed channels, this right was not a property right for
constitutional purposes. In rejecting the permittees' argument that they had
vested rights to the newly available channels and had detrimentally relied
on the Commission's earlier policy, the Commission cited the provisions
of sections 301 and 304 of the Communications Act, as well as the numerous cases holding that the Commission had authority to modify any
authorization if in its judgment doing so would promote the public interest.' 60 The Commission did admit that the disappointed permittees had equities, but6 held that any such equities had to give way to the overall public
interest.' '
In DirecTV, Inc. v. FCC, the court of appeals denied rejected claims
of detrimental reliance. 162 Without even referring to the issue of property
rights or their absence, the court found that the Commission's decision to
auction channels previously promised to petitioners was neither impermissibly retroactive nor arbitrary and capricious. Indeed the
court said there
6
was no retroactivity at all in the Commission's decision.' 1

158. DBS Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 9712, paras. 133, 138, 140, 1 Comm. Reg. (P
& F) 928.
159. What is meant by a "vested right" may depend on the context. The concept appears
to have arisen in respect to real estate. It may be defined as an "immediate fixed right of
present or future enjoyment." Pearsall v. Great No. Ry. Co., 161 U.S. 646, 673 (1896). The
Court also refers to the distinction drawn by Justice Cooley between vested rights, on the
one hand, and expectant or contingent rights on the other. Rights are expectant "when they
depend upon the continued existence of the present condition of things until the happening
of some future event." Id. The latter formulation, if taken literally, might preclude any FCC
license rights from being "vested" given the Commission's broad rulemaking powers. Put
another way, there would be no vested right in existing law.
160. DBS Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 9712, para. 139, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 928;
see also 47 C.F.R. § 100.19(a) (1996), which specifies that interim DBS authorizations
"shall be subject to... any policies and rules the Commission may adopt at a later date."
161. DBS Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 9712, paras. 142, 144-46, 1 Comm. Reg. (P

& F)928.
162. DirecTV, 110 F.3d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See infra Part IV.A. for further discussion
of this case.
163. Id. at 821, 826.
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IV. RETROACTIVITY
A.

In General

In Section ll.G of this Article, the Commission's broad authority to
amend existing rules and licenses is set forth. That authority is both wide
and deep but is limited not only by statutory and APA restrictions but also
by bounds on the legality of adopting rules with adverse retroactive effect.' 6 As a general rule, retroactivity is not favored: 65
[Tihe first rule of construction is that legislation must be considered as
addressed to the future, not to the past.... [and] a retrospective operation will not be given to a statute which interferes with antecedent
rights... unless such be "the unequivocal and inflexible
import of the
' 66
terms, and the manifest intention of the legislature."'
Moreover, by definition under the APA, a rule is a pronouncement of
future effect. 67 Yet one of the most complex aspects of the power to modify licenses occurs in the context of the Commission's authority to adopt
rules which, while nominally forward-looking, have retroactive effects.
The D.C. Circuit has observed that courts have long hesitated to permit the
"extraordinary step" of retroactive rule making and have noted its troubling nature: "When parties rely on an admittedly lawful regulation and
plan their activities accordingly, retroactive modification or rescission of
the regulation can cause great mischief. 68 Accordingly under judicial review, administrative decisions involving retroactivity require a higher
standard of justification than is generally the case in the absence of retroactive effect. 69 Indeed, the law in this area is indisputably relevant to the
Commission's power to alter prior license rights or powers but is not altogether clear. The Supreme Court has stated in Motor Vehicle Manufactur164. It is important to distinguish cases involving reliance interests from those in which
retroactivity is an issue. Although reliance and retroactivity both look to the past, are often
conjoined, and reliance is the rubric under which retroactivity is challenged, the reverse is
not always true. That is, simple reliance cases need not and often do not involve retroactivity. See, for example, Radio Rockford, Inc., Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 689, para. 4, 6 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 907 (1966), in which the Commission rejected applicant's claim that the Commission should waive new, indisputably prospective rules, merely because applicant had expended funds to prepare an application in reliance on the prior rule. Neither the Commission nor the courts have always articulated this distinction.
165. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,208 (1988).
166. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913)
(quoting United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399, 413 (1806)); see also Greene v.
United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964).
167. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1994).
168. Yakima Valley Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 794 F.2d 737, 745-46 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
169. See id. at 746 (reviewing courts must critically examine retroactive rule making to
ensure that agency has appropriately balanced competing considerations).
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ers Ass 'n of United States v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co.
that an agency decision to rescind or modify an existing regulation should
be reviewed under the "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law" standard of § 706(2)(A).' 70 Yet this
does not begin to recognize the complexity of the issues presented by
claims of unlawful retroactive rule making.
The first and most fundamental uncertainty is determining what constitutes retroactivity. The leading case is Georgetown University Hospital
in which Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, sought to clarify the extent to which an administrative agency by rule can retroactively alter its
rules or policies. Justice Scalia divided retroactivity into two categories.
The first is primary retroactivity, which alters the legal consequences of
past actions and is unlawful unless specifically permitted by statute. Secondary retroactivity concerns and affects, to the extent legally authorized,
past transactions in prescribing rules for the future; it may be lawful if the
burden on the private party is outweighed by the benefit of imposing a retroactive rule, that is, whether the retroactivity can pass a reasonableness
test. If the agency decision cannot pass the reasonableness test it may on
that basis be arbitrary and capricious under § 706(2)(A). Justice Scalia
also sought to distinguish permissible from impermissible retroactivity by
examining the effect of a new rule on prior legal rights. Justice Scalia
stated that Health and Human Services (HHS) could have applied its new
hospital reimbursement formulas in the future, even though respondents
may have been operating under contracts previously negotiated in reliance
on prior rules, but HHS could not prescribe such a formula for costs reimbursable while the prior rule was in effect because the latter changed the
law retroactively in violation of § 551(4).2 The Justice cautioned, however, that the reasonableness test for secondary retroactivity cannot be
used to validate a regulation which changes "what was the law in the past,"
since rules must apply only to the future. 73 The concurring opinion in
Georgetown University Hospital emphasized also that the APA's dichotomy between adjudication and rule making is vital to consideration of the
lawfulness of rules with alleged retroactive effect. SEC v. Chenery
Corp.,'74 Justice Scalia noted, involved adjudication, a form of administrative action in which "retroactivity is not only permissible but standard.
170. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., 463 U.S. 29,41 (1983).
171. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 219-20 (1988); 5 U.S.C. § 706
(2)(A). The notion of "secondary retroactivity" is addressed in John K. McNulty, Corporations and the IntertemporalConflict of Laws, 55 CAL. L. REv. 12, 58-60 (1967).
172. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. at 220; 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).
173. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. at 220.
174. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
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Adjudication deals with what the law was; rulemaking deals with what the
law will be."'75 Administrative agencies, therefore, enjoy the power to
make purely prospective law through rule making, something which courts
are not supposed to do; but they should not make purely prospective rules
through adjudication which affects both prior and future acts since
17 6 the design of the APA does not contemplate that method of lawmaking.
In Landgrafv. USI Film Products,the Court addressed itself specifically to the difficulty of determining whether a particular statutory rule operates retroactively, indicating that a large measure of judgment is required
concerning the nature and extent of the change and the connectedness of
the new rule and a relevant past event." It also said that retroactivity, in
the true sense, occurs when action impairs vested rights possessed when an
agency acted to divest them, when action increases a party's liability for
past conduct, or when action imposes new duties with respect to transactions already completed.'78 The D.C. Circuit describes a statute as retroactive if it "'takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing law,
or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a79new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past."",1
It is often held that retroactive rule making is unlawful unless specifically authorized by statute.1 0 In Retail, Wholesale and Department
Store Union v. NLRB (Retail, Wholesale),8' a case involving adjudication,
the D.C. Circuit set forth a five-part test for determinations of reasonableness: (a) whether the case is one of first impression;'r (b) whether the new
175. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. at 220-21.
176. Id. at 221. In his concurring opinion in Georgetown University Hospital, Justice
Scalia concluded that there is no justification for a rule of law permitting retroactive rules
so long as they are reasonable. An agency bound by the APA may proceed by retroactive
rules, in his view, only when a particular statute explicitly or implicitly allows it to do so.
Id. at 223. It is not clear that this position has been widely accepted by the courts, which
appear to accept retroactivity in rule making if the reasonableness test is met.

177. Landgraf,511 U.S. 244, 269-70 (1994).
178. Id. at 280.
179. Association of Accredited Cosmetology Sch. v. Alexander, 979 F.2d 859, 864
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Neild v. District of Columbia, 110 F.2d 246, 254 (D.C. Cir.
1940) (quoting Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767

(C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156))).
180. See, e.g., Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. v. Oman, 969 F.2d 1154, 1156 (D.C. Cir.
1992). The FCC recognizes the "general prohibition on retroactive rulemaking." See Implementation of Sections of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992: Rate Reg., Third Order on Reconsideration, 9 FCC Rcd. 4316, paras. 108, 118, 74
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1274 (1994).
181. Retail, Wholesale, 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
182. Given the equitable flavor of the five-part test one would expect the "case of first
impression" test, if answered in the affirmative, to support prospective application only. In
Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. FederalEnergy Reg. Comm'n., 826 F.2d 1074,
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rule is an abrupt departure from well established prior practice, or just fills
in a void in an unsettled area of law; (c) the extent of reliance on the prior
rule by the party challenging the retroactivity; (d) the degree of burden
which a retroactive order would have on the party challenging it; and (e)
the public interest in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on
the old standard.'8 3 While the D.C. Circuit has carefully circumscribed the
Retail, Wholesale criteria to cases of adjudication in Motion Picture Ass'n
ofAmerica v. Oman,' it would appear that an essentially similar balancing
test applies to retroactivity in rule making.'85 Indeed, the lawfulness of retroactive rule making is often measured by reference to the standards set
forth in Chenery and Retail, Wholesale.8 6 These factors have come to represent the "reasonableness" rule in judicial review of agency rules challenged on grounds of retroactivity.
What constitutes retroactivity thus is far from clear, let alone the determination of reasonable retroactivity. Despite the courts' stated heightened concerns about retroactive rule making it is difficult to see significant
differences in reviewing courts' treatment of agency action in such instances. In cases involving retroactivity, or allegations of retroactivity, the
courts overwhelmingly have sustained agency action, finding some element of retroactive loss or diminution of an authorization or of an opportunity acceptable in the context of overall purposes which are legitimate.""
1081-82 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 913 (1988), Judge Starr reached the opposite conclusion where the new rule is applied in an adjudication. Judge Mikva, in a vigorous
dissent, found this conclusion diametrically wrong. Id. at 1093-95.
183. Retail, Wholesale, 466 F.2d at 390.
184. Motion PicturesAss'n of Am., 969 F.2d at 1158.
185. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (rulemaking case in
which the last four Retail, Wholesale factors are listed among the considerations which enter into a determination of retroactivity), cert. denied sub nom. Alabama Power Co. v. Sierra Club, 468 U.S. 1204 (1984); see also McElroy Elec. Corp. v. FCC, 990 F.2d 1351,
1365 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (stating FCC must provide reasoned justification reflecting balancing
of all relevant interests involved in retroactivity decisions).
186. See, e.g., Maxcell Telecom Plus, Inc. v. FCC, 815 F.2d 1551, 1554-55 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
187. It is worth noting, however, that an agency adopting a retroactive change in policy
is subject to a higher standard of justification. Yakima Valley Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 794
F.2d 737, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Nor do courts always defer to agency determinations involving allegations of unlawful retroactivity because such review "'is in each case a question of law, resolvable by reviewing courts with no overriding obligation to the agency['s]
decision."' Maxcell, 815 F.2d at 1554 (Bork, J.) (quoting Retail, Wholesale, 466 F.2d at
390); accord, Mason Gen. Hosp. v. HHS, 809 F.2d 1220, 1224 (6th Cir. 1987); Daughters
of Miriam Ctr. for the Aged v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 1250, 1259 (3d Cir. 1978). It is not at all
clear that this is the law in the D.C. Circuit. In Association of Accredited Cosmetology
Schools v. Alexander, 979 F.2d 859, 866 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1992), the court could "not let pass"
the petitioner's assertion that the D.C. Circuit had held in Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating
Agency, 826 F.2d at 1094, that "[a]gencies possess no particular expertise on the issue of
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Judicial affirmance rests either on a finding that no retroactive effect exists, or that the retroactivity is reasonable. A statute does not operate retrospectively "merely because it... upsets expectations based in prior law" '88
or because facts or requisites for its operation are drawn from a time antecedent to its enactment. 8 9 The D.C. Circuit has noted that "most economic
regulation would be unworkable if all laws disrupting prior expectations
were deemed suspect."'
When challenged on retroactivity grounds, the Commission frequently cites to General Telephone Co. v. United States for the proposition
that retroactive effects of newly adopted rules may be legal if they are reasonable. '9' The case involved FCC adoption of rules barring telephone

companies from continuing to provide Community Antenna Television
(CATV)' 2 service. Citing the reasonableness rule, the court sustained the
Commission's new rule: "That rules of general application, though prospective in form, may ascribe consequences to events which occurred prior
to their issuance does not, on that basis alone, invalidate them."' 93 The
court added the following: "Where the on-rushing course of events have
outpaced the regulatory process, the Commission should be enabled to
remedy the problems of undue concentration of control over communications media by retroactive adjustments, provided they are reasonable."' 94 It
also observed that "the property of regulated industries is held subject to
such limitations as may reasonably be imposed upon it in the public interest and the courts have frequently recognized that new rules may abolish

retroactivity, and reviewing courts in turn have 'no overriding obligation of deference' to an
agency's decision to give retroactive effect to a new rule." Alexander, 979 F.2d at 866 n.1.
The decision rejects such a doctrine: "In fact, we held no such thing-the quoted passage
came from the dissenting opinion." Id. In any case, there is something inherently circular
about this doctrine. If the lawfulness of agency determinations involving claims of retroactivity is tested without deference to the agency's resolution, then the court, as a logical
matter, cannot be deferring to the agency's evaluation of the reasonableness of the retroactivity. Since the importance of imposing the new policy both generally and retroactively is
inherent in any such reasonableness test, the court either is deferring to the agency in reviewing the latter's decision, or is giving no deference to any aspect of the agency's decision concerning retroactivity, including, for example, even the expert agency's weighing of
technical factors.
188. Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 269 (1994) (citations omitted).
189. See Reynolds v. United States, 292 U.S. 443,449 (1934).
190. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 869 F.2d 1526, 1536 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
191. General TeL, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971).
192. Community cable operators originally used antenna to receive signals. Thus the
service was referred to as Community Antenna Television (CATV). Today, CATV is often
used to refer to cable television. Eds.
193. General Tel., 449 F.2d at 863.
194. Id.
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or modify pre-existing interests."'95 However, the court was clearly influenced by factors which mitigated the harshness of the new rule: the telephone companies' divestiture of their CATV interests could take place
over a four-year period, and waivers of that requirement were available.
Moreover, the phone company had been on notice since 1956 through a series of judicial and regulatory proceedings that such divestiture might be
required. 9 6 While finding the retroactivity before it acceptable on equitable
grounds, the court also noted that "even where reliance is strong, regulations may be altered retroactively. Indeed very substantial reliance is
sometimes disregarded."' 97
The Commission has been successful three times in recent D.C. Circuit cases involving alleged unlawful retroactivity. In Bell Atlantic Telephone Cos. v. FCC, Judge Randolph rejected a number of claims of retroactivity involving FCC adjustments to the price cap indices applicable to
local exchange carriers. 9 The so-called "Add-Back Order" had required
the LECs to adjust their 1994 earnings to determine their 1995 price caps.
The court rejected claims of retroactivity because the adjustments affected
only future rates. It observed that no refunds were required and current
tariffs were not rendered unlawful.' 9 The court noted also that the rules did
draw upon "antecedent facts" but did not increase liability for past transactions, nor regulate past transactions.2 ° Analyzing Association of Accredited Cosmetology Schools v. Alexander, Randolph noted that the court held
that the rule challenged there was not retroactive because the government
did not undo past eligibility but merely looked at prior default rates in setting future eligibility. 20' After concluding that the retroactive effect of the
Add-Back Order was only secondary and was reasonable, the court also
noted that the rule did not upset petitioners' reasonable reliance interests.
For the latter conclusion, it recited regulatory history to show that the

195. Id. at 864 (citing inter alia WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601 (2nd Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 393 U.S. 914 (1968); American Airlines,
Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966)).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 864 n.18 (citations omitted). The court's analysis is imprecise or unclear. Can
there be "strong" reliance even when the relying party was or should have been on notice
that the prior rules were being reviewed and were good prospects for revision? Does the
strength of the reliance interest turn on the extent of the reliance, e.g. in dollars, or on its
prudence or reasonableness, under the circumstances?
198. BellAtl. Tel., 79 F.3d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
199. Id. at 1206.
200. Id. at 1206-07; accord, Maxcell Telecom Plus, Inc. v. FCC, 815 F.2d 1551, 1555
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating petitioner not deprived of any right or given new and unexpected
liabilities).
201. Bell Atl. Tel., 79 F.3d at 1207.
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LECs could not simply have assumed that they would not be subjected to
the add-back obligation, adding "[flurthermore, the rule does not 'make
worthless substantial past investment incurred in reliance upon the prior
rule."'m Finally, Judge Randolph noted that the "[Add-Back] rule gives
petitioners the benefit of their bargain." '
The D.C. Circuit again addressed claims of reliance and retroactivity
in DirecTV, Inc. v. FCC in which Judge Ginsburg rejected claims of unlawful primary and secondary retroactivity. 2m As set forth above in Part
Ill.C., petitioners in DirecTV argued that the Commission had unlawfully
deprived them of certain reclaimed DBS channels which the Commission
had earlier promised to distribute to DBS permittees whose channel requests could not be fully satisfied at an earlier stage of the industry's development.205 Judge Ginsburg first held that the primary retroactivity claim,
based on the argument that the Commission's auction decision deprived
petitioners of their previously granted rights to a portion of any forfeited
channels, was invalid because it did not meet any of the three criteria of
Landgrafv. USI Film Products.20 That is to say, the auction decision did
not impair rights a party possessed when it acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to completed transactions0 7 As to the first criterion, Judge Ginsburg noted that the earlier
decision in ContinentalSatellite Corp.0 8 to apportion any reclaimed channels did not bestow rights to any specific channels, but only set forth a
Commission plan; the ContinentalSatellite decision was, in his view, pro9
spective only, addressing what the Commission would do in the futureY2

202. Id. (citing Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 220 (1988)
(Scalia, J. concurring)).
203. Id.; see also Mobile Comm. Corp. of Am. v. FCC, 77 F.3d 1399, 1407 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (finding that the Commission, by withdrawing its oft-repeated promise of a free pioneer's preference license, had failed to give adequate consideration to appellant's reliance
concerns); Adelphia Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 88 F.3d 1250, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (rejecting
an "equitable claim" against application of a new rule because petitioners had, by disregarding the possibility of a rule change, misread the Commission); cf. James Cable Partners,
L.P. v. City of Jamestown, Tenn., 822 F. Supp. 476, 478 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (stating the
Cable Act of 1992 should not be construed to apply retroactively although it could so apply
without being a "taking" because FCC conduct put industry on notice of its potential exercise of regulatory authority), aff'd, 43 F.3d 277 (6th Cir. 1995).
204. DirecTV, 110 F.3d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
205. See supraPart Ill.C.
206. Landgraf,511 U.S. 244 (1994).
207. DirecTV, 110 F.3d at 825-26.
208. Continental Satellite Corp., 4 FCC Rcd. 6292, 66 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1185
(1989), partial reconsiderationdenied by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 5 FCC Rcd.
7421 (1990).
209. DirecTV, 110 F.3d at 826.
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While the DirecTV decision found petitioners' expectations of further
channel assignments reasonable, it concluded that such expectations, based
on prior law, were not sufficient to bar the agency from altering prior
law.210
Similarly, the court rejected petitioners' companion argument that,
even if the FCC's decision to auction channels previously committed to
them was not primarily retroactive, it was nevertheless invalid on the
ground that it was secondarily retroactive. Here, petitioners relied on their
expenditure of millions of dollars to build satellites of sufficient capacity
to put to use any channels subsequently allocated under ContinentalSatellite. The court concluded that the sort of "'retroactivity"' represented by
such expenditures had never been treated as "necessarily violating a separate legal standard., 21 ' The court added that a rule which upsets expectations may be sustained if it is reasonable, for example not arbitrary or capricious, and a change in policy is not arbitrary or capricious merely
because it alters the current state of affairs. The court also addressed the
factual analysis made by the Commission in support of its decision to auction the reclaimed channels and concluded that such analysis was not arbitrary or capricious.2"2 In doing so, the court relied on prior cases which
provide wide latitude for an agency to change its policies if it considers the
relevant factors2 3 and provides a reasoned explanation for its decision to
alter prior policies.2 4
The third recent case involving claims of unlawful retroactive rule
making on the part of the FCC arose in Chadmoore Communications, Inc.
v. FCC.2 5 Appellant, an applicant seeking approval to extend the time
within which it was obliged to complete construction of a Special Mobile
Radio (SMR) system, alleged that the Commission erred by denying the
request on the basis of a rule adopted after the application for extension of
time had been filed, and after the applicant, in reasonable reliance on the
prior rules, had expended much time, effort, and money to fulfill its construction plans. Chadmoore's argument, as presented to the court, relied
heavily on the Yakima Valley case.2 6 Chadmoore complained that the
210. Id. (citing Landgraf,511 U.S. at 269 n.24).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 826-27.
213. Id. at 826 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
214. Id. (citing Black Citizens for a Fair Media v. FCC, 719 F.2d 407, 411 (D.C. Cir.
1983); Committee for Effective Cellular Rules v. FCC, 53 F.3d 1309, 1317 (D.C. Cir.
1995)).
215. Chadmoore Comm., 113 F.3d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
216. Yakima Valley Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 794 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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Commission had not balanced the harm to Chadmoore against the benefits
of applying its new rule retroactively. Citing DirecTV and Landgraf,the
court rejected Chadmoore's claims principally on two grounds: (1) that the
Commission had not relied on the new rule in refusing Chadmoore's request for more time to construct and (2) that, in any case the new rule,
even if it had been applied to Chadmoore's circumstances, would not have
involved any retroactive effect because it did not impair existing rights, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.2 17 The court noted that the applicant's liability for past conduct was not increased, nor were any new duties
imposed on it with respect to completed transactions. Nor, said the court,
did the Commission's decision impair
any rights since, as a mere appli21 8
cant, Chadmoore had no vested rights.
On its face, Chadmoore seems clearly correct. When the applicant
filed for extended authority, it had notice through a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking that extended implementation requests might be denied. In
contrast, the petitioners in DirecTV had acted in reliance on Commission
policy years before the FCC gave notice that it might alter the DBS channel allocation rules. Chadmoore is particularly interesting, however, because the court's opinion addressed the distinction between lawful retroactivity in adjudication and that in rulemaking-an important distinction
and one which the D.C. Circuit had not emphasized in recent cases involving retroactivity. 9 Quoting its own Georgetown University Hospitalv.
Bowen,m the court noted that rules adopted in rulemakings under the APA
must be given future effect only; for this reason, "'equitable considerations
are irrelevant to the determination of whether the [agency's] rule may be
applied retroactively; such retroactive application is foreclosed by the express terms of the APA."'' By contrast, the court added, "an agency may
give retroactive effect to a new policy or rule adopted in the course of an

217. Chadmoore, 113 F.3d at 240 (citing DirecTV, 10 F.3d at 825-26 (quoting Landgraf
v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994))). Having rejected the claim of unlawful retroactivity, the Chadmoore decision went on to examine whether the FCC's action was arbitrary and capricious. The Court concluded that it was not because the newly adopted policies would be impaired by grant of the request for an extended construction period, and the
applicant had reasonable notice that its request might not be granted under the proposed
new rules. Id. at 241 (citing Adelphia Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 88 F.3d 1250, 1257-58 (D.C.
Cir. 1996)).
218. Id. at 240.
219. Id.
220. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 821 F.2d 750, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
221. Chadmoore,113 F.3d at240 (quoting Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 821 F.2d 750, 757
(D.C. Cir. 1987)).
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are 'counterbalanced by
adjudication so long as the resulting inequities
' ''
sufficiently significant statutory interests.
Because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit handles all
but a handful of the FCC's decisions which are reviewed judicially, an effort to derive some general principles from the D.C. Circuit's case law addressing retroactivity is warranted. Frankly it is difficult, as a matter of
common sense, not to see retroactivity in the facts presented to the court in
DirecTV. As noted above, petitioners contended that millions of dollars
had been expended in reliance on a carefully constructed Commission decision promising to assign reclaimed channels to a group of permittees under certain circumstances. Those circumstances arose and petitioners
claimed the channels, but at the last moment the FCC decided to award the
channels another way, and assets worth tens to hundreds of millions of
dollars were withdrawn from the permittees who had anticipated receiving
them. Whether or not that policy reversal is sound as a matter of public
policy, was justified by the particular circumstances facing the Commission when it changed its views, or was just one of a number of rational
choices available given the circumstances2 3 is quite a different question
from the determination whether the effect was retroactive. To this commentator, at least, retroactivity is quite plain in the premises. What the
court has done in DirecTV, however, is to define away retroactivity altogether. Certainly there is language in Landgraf which can be used to justify the court's conclusion that retroactivity does not exist in DirecTV.'
On the other hand, its analysis of the facts is wooden and fails to deal with
222. Id. (quoting Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 821 F.2d at 756 (citing Retail, Wholesale
and Dep't. Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Yakima Valley Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 794 F.2d 737, 745-46 (D.C. Cir. 1986))).
223. Apart from whether the court's application of existing law to petitioners' allegations in DirecTV is legally sound, one would have to be extraordinarily naive not to understand that the Commission's decision to change its policy from one of reallocating to existing permittees recaptured channels to one of auctioning such recaptured channels was
driven simply and solely by the Commission's desire to raise hundreds of millions of dollars in such an auction. The petitioners in DirecTV did not present this argument for judicial
review. The argument that the Commission's DBS decisional processes had been tainted by
unlawful and illegitimate considerations of revenue generation and the presumptive political
advantages of such activity to the agency had, however, been briefed extensively in Advanced Communications Corp. v. FCC, 84 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 117 S.Ct. 718 (1997). In its unpublished opinion in Advanced Communications,the
court summarily rejected such argument and noted that it would not address such allegations because appellants had not pointed to anything in the record sufficient to overcome
the "strong presumption of agency regularity." Advanced Comm., 84 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (per curiam) (quoting Louisiana Ass'n of Indep. Producers v. Federal Energy Reg.
Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1101, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
224. But see Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 268 n.23 (1994) (providing
precedent with broad definitions of retroactivity).
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much of its own precedent emphasizing that allegations of retroactivity require particularly careful judicial scrutiny.
More broadly, in the context of administrative regulations a moment's reflection will suffice to demonstrate that the presumption against
retroactivity must be applied with considerable delicacy: Administrative
agencies exist primarily to develop specialized expertise and to apply such
expertise to the often technical and dynamic demands of modem life. If
any change in administrative regulations which alters prior rules or policies could be successfully challenged on that ground alone, the very heart
of administrative lawmaking would be eviscerated. Therefore, to give
proper respect to the default rule of prospectivity, retroactivity must be defined in such a way that it protects legitimate expectations while taking account of the special nature of administrative lawmaking. In this sense, a
rule is not retroactive merely because it changes prior expectations or upsets a reliance interest because regulatees should not anticipate that the
rules under which they act cannot be altered to their disadvantage. As the
Supreme Court said in Landgraf.
The conclusion that a particular rule operates "retroactively" comes at
the end of a process of judgment concerning the nature and extent of
the change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event. Any test of retroactivity
will leave room for disagreement in hard cases, and is unlikely to classify the enormous variety of legal changes with perfect philosophical
clarity.'
225. Id. at 270. Moreover, in the 1996-97 term the Court revisited and, in a less than
pellucid passage, cautioned against reading Landgraftoo broadly. In Lindh v. Murphy, 117
S. Ct. 2059 (1997), a case construing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, enacting 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West Supp.
1997), the Court warned against reading Landgrafto establish the principle that in determining whether a statute produces a retroactive effect the default rule disfavoring retroactive application in the absence of clear Congressional intent to achieve such a result should
be the operative test.
Although Landgrafs default rule would deny application [of the statute] when a
retroactive effect would otherwise result, other construction rules may apply to
remove even the possibility of retroactivity .... [I]n sum, if the application of a
term would be retroactive as to Lindh the term will not be applied, even if, in the
absence of retroactive effect, we might find the term applicable; if it would be
prospective, the particular degree of prospectivity intended in the Act will be
identified in the normal course in order to determine whether the term does apply
as to Lindh.
117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063. What this appears to mean is that determining the presence of retroactivity requires looking at the relevant provisions of the statute before applying the default
rule which disfavors such retroactivity unless Congress has affirmatively required such a
result. The Lindh decision struggles manfully with determining Congressional intent only to
note that "in a world of silk purses and pigs' ears, the [Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty] Act is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting." Id. at 2068. One might respectfully say the same of this latest judicial foray into establishing the rules of retroactiv-
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Accordingly, while a private party may find the sting of modified
rules affecting its prior status difficult to bear, the fact is that the FCC has
wide powers to alter the scope of licensees' authorizations under the
Communications Act and has not infrequently relied on them to achieve its
public interest objectives, even when doing so effectuated retroactive and
detrimental changes.
B.

Auctioning of Licenses

The foregoing discussion deals only with licenses granted by the
Commission without the payment of significant fees. Excluding acquisition or transactional expenses and relatively insubstantial filing fees, these
may be considered "free" licenses.22 In 1993, however, the Communications Act was amended by the addition of section 309(j), giving the Commission authority to auction spectrum under certain circumstances.2 7 The
Commission immediately and aggressively resorted to its auction authority, adopted rules, and quickly raised many billions of dollars."" Although
the auction process involves paying directly for an authorization that previously would have been granted without any such payment, Congress
made very clear that auction-winner licensees did not acquire any ownership interests in the assigned frequencies. The auction statute declares that:
"Nothing in this subsection or in the use of competitive bidding shall...
be construed to convey any rights, including any expectation of renewal of
a license, that differ from the rights that apply to other licenses within the
same service that were not issued [by auction]." ' Beyond that unequivocal language, other provisions reinforce congressional intent to constrain
the rights of auction winners. Section 309(j)(3)(C) thus speaks of the
avoidance of unjust enrichment in awarding of licenses by auction; §
309(j)(4)(B) requires the Commission to adopt rules creating performance
requirements to prevent warehousing of spectrum by auction winners; and
§ 309(j)(4)(E) calls on the Commission to require transfer disclosures and
antitrafficking restrictions as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.2 °
The Commission has implemented these directives in numerous regulaity.
226. That such licenses, at least in the broadcast context, can be anything but free is evident from the high costs of acquiring an existing broadcast station. Of course, in such cases
the cost is imposed by the seller rather than by the government.
227. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002(a), 107
Stat. 387 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 3090) (1994)).
228. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§ 24.701-24.720 (1996). As of October 1996, these auctions
had raised commitments of more than $20 billion for the federal treasury.
229. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(6)(D).
230. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(C), (4)(B), (E).

Number 1]

PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER 1934 ACT

tions adopted pursuant to the law. However, no Commission decision implementing § 309(j) has addressed the question whether a license bought
and paid for at auction bestows property rights on the licensee which do
not exist in the traditional context of licenses awarded without payment to
the government; Congress appears to have foreclosed any such arguments.
Nevertheless, one would expect that application of the Commission's
authority to alter, amend, curtail, or diminish licensee rights as set forth in
more than sixty years of Commission and judicial history would raise a
wholly new set of issues in such a context. At the very least the test of reasonableness as applied to secondary retroactivity could be expected to give
great weight to the investment made by an auction winner. But that might
not be enough. Once having paid cold cash for a license, a licensee disappointed by a government assault on its authority would undoubtedly make
constitutional arguments involving a Fifth Amendment taking of property.2 ' It would be reasonable to expect such claims to be treated more
carefully than in prior cases, notwithstanding the language of §
309(j)(6)(D) and the applicability of §§ 301, 304, and 316 to licenses
granted by auction. 3 Even if the Commission's authority to amend, alter,
or curtail existing licenses were deemed sufficient to adversely affect or
even terminate an auctioned authorization, a strong argument for fair compensation would appear to be reasonable. 23
An interesting twist on the question of the property rights of an auc-

231. 47 C.F.R. § 21.936(a) provides that, in the context of MDS authorizations granted
by auction, the Commission may revoke or cancel an authorization, inter alia, for "gross
misconduct." See Amendment of Parts 21 and 74 of the Comm'n's Rules with Regard to
Filing Procedures, Report and Order,10 FCC Rcd. 9589, para. 42, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
856 (1995), reconsiderationgranted in part and denied in partby Memorandum and Order
on Reconsideration, 10 FCC Rcd. 13821, 1 Comm. Reg. 1 (1995). It is doubtful that such a
vague standard would be sustained if an authorization awarded after auction were withdrawn on such grounds.
232. One commentator has suggested that fee-based incentives for efficient use of spectrum might turn on the concept of spectrum access rights (SAR). See Terrence J.
Schroepfer, Fee-BasedIncentives and the Efficient Use of Spectrum, 44 FED. COMM. L.J.
411,431 (1992); see also Arthur S. De Vany, supra note 11.
233. Cf. Monroe Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 900 F.2d 351, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Silberman,
J., concurring) (stating if license holder paid for a license, incumbency might bear weight in
comparative renewal case); Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1444 n.1 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (discussing in dicta that claims of government taking of private property are compensable in district court and/or the U.S. Claims Court). The long-standing rule against retroactive rule making may be relevant. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 578
(1981) (FPC has no power to alter gas rates retroactively but can only set just and reasonable rate to be charged in the future); cf Shanbaum v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 177, 179 n.5,
52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1499 (1982) (stating that because an FCC policy constituting normal regulatory action cannot amount to a taking, it is unnecessary to decide whether licensee has a property right which can be taken) affd mem., 723 F.2d 69 (1983).
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tion-winning licensee has arisen in instances where the government seeks
to retrieve the license for nonpayment by the licensee of the periodic postgrant payments specified in the Commission's rules.23 As set forth in Part
II.F.2 above, this possibility has arisen in the case of certain PCS C and F
Block auction winners, who are actively seeking a rescheduling of their
payment obligations to the U.S. government. In the face of potential retreats to bankruptcy by auction winners who cannot meet their originally
imposed obligations and have been unsuccessful in securing an easing of
those burdens, the question whether the government, as a creditor, is required to accept the normal processes of the Bankruptcy Code, or can circumvent them, has arisen rather sharply. While the Commission, acting
through Chairman Hundt, has aggressively asserted the view that such licensees should have essentially no rights in bankruptcy' 5 the logic of this
position is somewhat difficult to understand. To be sure, in the case of a
default in payment the license must revert to the Commission for it to
make a new public interest determination, as in any case of licensee bankruptcy. But why an auction-winning licensee who has defaulted in its obligations to pay the FCC for the license should be in any worse position visa-vis the bankruptcy laws than a licensee who has defaulted in making
post-license transfer payments to a prior licensee is not obvious. Even less
clear is why a licensee who has paid the government for a license should
have fewer or lesser rights in bankruptcy vis-h-vis the government than a
licensee who has not paid for the license. After all, the language of §
3090) quoted above merely denies auction winners any more license rights
than are held by nonauction licensees; it does not deprive them of any such
rights held by other licensees. Morever, third-party creditors may be expected to have legitimate interests in the equitable disposition for which
the bankruptcy courts have been established. Indeed, given the fundamentally equitable nature of bankruptcy proceedings, it would appear appropriate for the government in its multiple roles as regulator, grantor of a license for payment, and first-secured creditor of the licensee to accept the
normal processes of bankruptcy courts, as must any other party.2 6 Delaying the recapture and regrant (i.e., resale) of the spectrum rights at issue is
simply one of the negative but logically reciprocal effects of treating auctioned licenses as commercial commodities. 37
234. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(e).
235. See supra Part H.F.2.
236. As of August 5, 1997, it appears that the Chairman's views have been unavailing.
The Budget Reconciliation Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, into which the
Chairman wished to insert proposed alterations to the Bankruptcy Code, was passed by
Congress with no such changes.
237. The foregoing does not in any way express an opinion on the merits of any yet-to-
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V. CONCLUSION
Although there is substantial variation from case to case and not infrequent inconsistency in judicial and administrative pronouncements, it is
reasonably clear that FCC licenses have some, albeit limited, attributes of
property. Moreover, considerations of justifiable reliance-often cloaked
in the language of fundamental fairness rather than explicitly in terms of
detrimental reliance-appear to have at least some force in the cases. It is
difficult to construct any sort of consistent explanation for judicial reactions to claims of detrimental reliance. Some of the cases rejecting such
claims appear to rely on early signals from the Commission of possible
policy alterations, the insubstantiality of claimed damage or the absence of
unlawful retroactivity. If the ever-present power to change policy, as set
forth in WBEN and American Airlines, is adequate to justify adverse effects on existing licensees, justifiable reliance would appear to be irrelevant. But the courts do seem to take account of reliance, so the abstract
power to change policy, however grandly stated, in reality is subject to
boundaries imposed by judicial respect for substantial reliance interests.
One way to reconcile the seeming inconsistency would be to propose
that property rights as normally understood are not a necessary precondition to careful judicial review of agency policy changes. That is, detrimental reliance may represent a recognizable and legitimate basis on
which to seek relief even when, in the classical sense, there are no property
rights as such. As noted above equitable estoppel against the government
is like the weather: everybody talks about it, but nobody applies it. The
obverse circumstance may exist for detrimental reliance: no one will assert
that it is the equivalent of classical property rights, but court decisions recognize the potency of the argument often enough to permit the hypothesis
that it is in some measure and in some circumstances a workable substitute
for property rights.
It may simply be that, however elaborate their rationale, the courts
consider common sense fairness in evaluating claims of detrimental reliance, tucking their analysis under one or more of the formulaic approaches
relied upon in such cases. However described, taken together the cases
demonstrate that, notwithstanding the limited property rights held by FCC
licensees, they nevertheless have the right to be treated equitably by the
agency; the Commission cannot simply disregard their legitimate reliance
be-adopted FCC plan which has the effect of reducing or stretching out the financial obligations of an auction winner beyond those it voluntarily undertook in submitting a winning
bid for the license. It would appear to represent a serious incursion both into the fundamental rationale for auctioning of spectrum and into basic notions of fairness to permit such
post-grant reductions in the financial obligations of the winner.
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on prior policy, and the courts will not automatically defer to FCC conclusions concerning the balancing test which is required when claims of detrimental reliance are presented on judicial review. When the agency has
given even a modicum of warning that the policy on which a petitioner has
relied is subject to reexamination, such reliance claims are not likely to
carry much weight with the courts. Similarly, where the reliance is of minor consequence courts are not likely to disrupt administrative conclusions. New or amended policies which are purely prospective are harder to
attack on appeal. Indeed, most reliance claims do not result in remands,
much less reversals; in most unsuccessful efforts to assert reliance claims
the failure of petitioners appears to be one of proof rather than a conceptual weakness. Undoubtedly the courts hear a great many detrimental reliance claims in appeals of administrative action, and a somewhat skeptical
attitude is probably justified. 38 It should give petitioners comfort, however,
to recognize that where damaging prudent reliance of a substantial sort
based on a long-standing and unquestioned policy has occurred, especially
where a significant retroactive effect is arguable, courts will take a fresh
look at the claims presented, at least to the extent of not automatically deferring to the agency's decision below. While this may be comforting as a
general proposition, it does little for any effort to produce a more refined
analysis. In the inevitable battle between administrative agencies and reviewing courts, this appears to be merely one more instance where the ebb
and flow of facts and law present too uncertain a path for rigid rules.

238. An interesting review of the broad relationship between the FCC and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit appears in Michael J. Hirrel, Oil and Vinegar: The
FCC and the D.C. Circuit,CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 121(1995).

